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FROM THE HISTORY OF THE WORSHIP OF APOLLO AT ACTIUM

F. SOKOLOWSKI

GOUVIEUX, FRANCE

UNTIL the last few years we had scanty information on the cult of Apollo at Actium, which, after the victory of Augustus won there in 31 B.C., became very popular in the Greek and Roman world. The games of Actium, reorganized and elevated to panhellenistic rank, flourished for a long time in the Roman empire. The lucky discovery of an inscription at Olympia, from the end of the third century B.C., has now brought us new light on the earlier history of this cult.[1]

There was at Actium in the time of Thucydides a sanctuary of Apollo venerated and known throughout Acarnania and even abroad. Very early the city of Anactorion, of which Actium became a part, took over the direction and management of the cult. The games of Actium are attested as early as the fourth century; the head of a woman with the inscription AKTIAS figures on the coins of Anactorium from this time. This was the name of the festival in honor of Apollo, later changed to AKTIA.[2] At the end of the third century, but not before the peace of Naupactus (217 B.C.), the Confederation of Acarnania assumed the control and management of the festival.[3] The recently published inscription contains the clauses of an agreement on this matter between the federal government of Acarnania and the city of Anactorion.

The new document reveals to us many interesting details, mostly about the material side of the cult; the ceremonies are

[1] Ch. Habicht, "Eine Urkunde des Akarnanischen Bundes," Hermes, LXXXV, 1957, pp. 87 ff. Günther Klaffenbach, IG, IX 1^2, 2, 583. Cf. J. et L. Robert, "Bull. Épigr.," RÉG, LXXI, 1958, pp. 255–56, no. 270.

[2] Thuc., I, 29,3; Strab., VII, 325; Harpocr., s. v. Ἄκτια; Steph. Byz., s. v. Ἄκτιον. Cf. J. Keitz, "De Aetolorum et Acarnanum sacris," Diss. Hal., 1911, pp. 55 ff. M. P. Nilsson, "Gesch. griech. Rel.," I^2, p. 213.

[3] Ch. Habicht, op. cit., p. 93.

mentioned only incidentally, but even so certain features emerge.

The initiative for the agreement came from the authorities of Acarnania and not from Anactorion, which only with reluctance yielded to the request. The preamble of the document explains how the negotiations arose. The government of the Acarnanian Confederation, seeing that the city of Anactorion was unable to hold the festival because of difficulties resulting from the wars, and recognizing that it was expedient and honorable for the peoples of Acarnania, since they were now more prosperous, to develop and to foster devotion toward the gods and especially to provide for the worship of Apollo, decided to dispatch deputies to Anactorion for talks about the matter. The delegation, composed of eleven men in addition to the officers of the Confederacy, was a solemn one. The delegates asked the city to agree that Actium should be a common sanctuary for all Acarnanians, provided that appropriate care was taken of it and that the celebration of the festival was carried on in the traditional way. The city of Anactorion acceded to the request on the following terms: 1.) that the Confederation put the sanctuary in repair, and provide funds as needed for the performance of the ceremonies and games, the amount not to be less than that formerly provided by the city of Anactorion; 2.) that the hiring of musicians be carried out on terms set by the Confederation; 3.) that the income received from customs, from taxes on sales, and from other sources be divided evenly between the Confederation and Anactorion; 4.) that each party appoint four customs officers (*pentecostologoi*), their four secretaries, and an *agoranomos* (superviser of the market); 5.) that money and votive offerings dedicated prior to the agreement remain the property of Anactorion, future dedications to be the property of the Confederation; 6.) that the building called *Heleneion* (probably a hostel for the official delegations) and other edifices in the forest (around the sanctuary) remain the property of Anactorion, the hostels and shelters built by other cities also continuing in their original status; 7.) the provisions in lines 41–43, discussed below; 8.) that the city of Anactorion retain control of the port duties and of all other revenues except those levied during the feast days; 9.) that the Confederation hold the festival each year except

when it is impossible because of war or occupation by a friendly army (if, for these or other reasons, it is not possible to hold the games, the festival should be celebrated in Anactorion as before, i.e., by the city itself); 10.) that if the Confederation fail to fulfil the above conditions, the sanctuary should revert to its previous status, i.e., to the care of Anactorion, and all dedicated monies and offerings should remain the property of the god.

This agreement, so rich in stipulations concerning material problems, does not mention the details of worship except for some secondary features. It is stated that the Confederation should, in general, conduct the games in accordance with the sacred rules which the city of Anactorion established.[4] Only one feature of the ceremonies is prescribed, namely the order of the procession. It may be that the statue of Apollo was transported from Actium to Anactorion (as the same was done in Panamara and Stratoniceia), and for this reason the procession is mentioned. But such a ceremony was important in the program of all Greek festivals, and it could not be overlooked in an agreement on the matter of worship.[5] Unfortunately the lines of the inscription dealing with the procession are not completely preserved.[6] The editor of our document reads this part of the text as follows:

41 ——————— *πομπεύειν δὲ πρῶτομ μὲν τὰν [βουλὰν, ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ]ν ἀ-*

[. . . . .] *Ἀνακτορίου καὶ το[ὺς . . .] ίους ⟨κ⟩α[θ] ὡς κα ὁ ἱεραπόλος τάξῃ φορεῖν τὸν*

[. . . . .] ΣΘΑ . ΝΑ . . Ε . . Α . — . . Ν *καὶ τὰγ κόμαν τρέφειν.*

We find in the critical notes to these lines that Professor Klaffenbach read in line 43: ΟΙΑΝΑΚΤΟΡΙΕ[ΙΣ. I think that these letters are right, and I propose the following restoration: [7]

41 ——————— *πομπεύειν δὲ πρῶτομ μὲν τὰν [βολὰν, ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ]ν ἀ-*

[4] Line 69.

[5] Cf. M. P. Nilsson, "Opuscula," I, pp. 166 ff.; S. Eitrem, "Beitr. griech. Rel.," III, 1920, pp. 56 ff.; F. Böhmer, RE, XXI, 1952, pp. 1908 ff.

[6] Lines 41–43.

[7] Professor G. Klaffenbach has given me in his letter an indication on the reading of certain letters in this difficult passage. I thank him very kindly for this service.

[γωνοθέτην τὸν ἐκ] Ἀνακτορίου καὶ το[ὺς Ἀκτ]ίους ⟨κ⟩α[θ]ὼς
κα ὁ ἱεραπόλος τάξῃ φορεῖν τὸν
[κόδμον, τὰ ἱερὰ π]οτ' Ἀνακτόρι[ον] ἄ[γει]ν — — —

In the procession the council shall march first, then the *agônothetês* from Anactorion, and the Actians, according as the *hierapolos* orders them to wear the (holy) dress, to bring the cult requisites into Anactorion and to let their hair grow.

In these three lines the whole history of the cult of Actium seems to be summarized. The order in the march of the procession is to be as follows: the first place is reserved for the council, the second for the *agônothetês* (president of the games) appointed from the citizens of Anactorion, next come the delegates of Actium chosen by the *hierapolos* (the priest in the cult of Apollo). To the representatives of Actium is reserved the honor of carrying the statue of the god and other requisites of the cult. As is clear from these stipulations, the people of Actium and the city of Anactorion retained their rights in the performance of the ceremonies, although the festival itself was to be managed by the authorities of the Confederation.

The mention of long hair, which the servants of Apollo must let grow, is of special interest. The wearing of such a hair style was an old custom in ancient Greece, well attested by Homer and later sources. The gods and heroes of the Iliad and the Odyssey are portrayed with long hair.[8] This usage was maintained in certain Greek lands until late classical times, especially among the Dorians. In Athens it was abandoned after the fifth century, but the king-archon, the hierophant (in the Mysteries of Eleusis), and in general the priests, fortune-tellers, and philosophers kept to the old style.[9] Children usually wore one or more locks till the ceremony of shearing. We know from many inscriptions that children, adolescents and youngsters presented their shorn locks to the gods.[10] Diodorus tells us for instance that all the inhabitants of Leontini in Sicily let their hair grow

[8] Cf. P. Schredelseker, "De superstitione Graecorum quae ad crines pertinet," Diss. Heidelb., 1913, pp. 5 ff.; Bremer, RE, VII, 1910, p. 2118.

[9] Schredelseker, op. cit., p. 25.

[10] Cf. Sommer, RE, VII, 1910, pp. 2107 f.; O. Weinreich, "Eine delphische Mirakel-Inschrift," Sitzber. Ak. Heidelb., 1924–25, pp. 5 ff. J. Labarbe, Bull. Acad. Royale Belge, 1953, pp. 366 ff.

till a certain age, and then offered it to Iolaos; otherwise, it was believed, they were struck dumb.[11] Wearing the hair long was a feature of many religious usages. Plutarch remarks of all Greeks that when a disaster happens, the people change their hair style: the women cut their hair and the men let it grow.[12] According to ancient etymologists the name Ἀκαρνᾶνες means ἄκουροι, i.e., "unshorn."[13] It is of course a fanciful etymology, but it was perhaps in the line of the Acarnanian tradition that the servants of Apollo enlisted from Actium should wear long hair. The same usage was observed in the cult of Hera of Samos in the times of the poet Asius (seventh century B.C.), as we read in one of the fragments of his poetry:[14]

> Thus did they go, when they had combed their locks, to the sanctuary of Hera, swathed in beautiful robes, their snow-white mantles reaching to the earth, with gold ornaments, like cicadas, on their head, and their hair bound with golden ribbons waving in the wind.

We find the following recommendation concerning hair and dress in the hymn of Isyllos of Epidaurus:[15]

> To select and to summon by tribes whichever men may be best in this city of Epidaurus, those who have in their hearts virtue and reverence that safeguard the city; to summon them and to have them lead a procession to lord Phoebus and to his son Asclepius, the physician, dressed in white raiment and with flowing hair; to lead a solemn procession to the temple of Apollo bearing garlands of laurel and then to the temple of Asclepius bearing branches of tender olive shoots.[15a]

The greatest part of the agreement between the Acarnanian Confederation and the city of Anactorion concerns finances. We know that festivals and games in ancient Greece were linked with fairs and markets, which brought to the cities a quite important profit. This income, according to our document, is to be divided in half between the contracting parties. Among other sources of revenue two items are specially named: 1.) the *pentecostê*, and

[11] IV 24,4.
[12] Mor. 267 B.
[13] Strab. X 465; Dio Chrysostom. II, 12. Cf. Iliad II 542.
[14] Athen. XII 525 F.
[15] IG, IV^2, 1, 128, 15–21.
[15a] Transl. by E. J. Edelstein and L. Edelstein, Asclepius II, p. 146, quoted by kind permission of Professor L. Edelstein.

2.) a tax on the sale of slaves. The first was a custom duty of 2% on the value of all goods brought in or out. A tax on the sale of slaves existed in many Greek cities, especially in the eastern part of the ancient world. Slaves were sold in considerable numbers at many sanctuaries during the festivals, and this is perhaps a reason (among others) why so many contracts recording the sale of slaves to the gods are to be found in Delphi and other sanctuaries. The rules regulating the celebration of the Mysteries of Andania include a paragraph on marketing: the *agoranomos* (supervisor of the market) is responsible and must see to it that the wares displayed are of good quality, and that merchants use weights and measures approved by the state; no tax is to be paid for a stand at the market, no prices are to be prescribed, and no hours of buying and selling are to be fixed.[16] In some places before festivals a tax cut was proclaimed with the aim of drawing more people to attend.

For the sharing and use of profits from the festival of Actium, we have a good parallel in the regulation of the Mysteries just quoted.[17] Here the income was obtained from three sources: 1.) from purifications, 2.) from initiation fees, and 3.) from other revenues. After the celebration of the feast, a commission composed of five men was to collect and count the income. One part of it was appropriated to cover the expenses of the festival, another part was invested in the repair and construction of buildings, and the rest was handed over to the state. Mnasistratos, a man who contributed much to the development of the Mysteries, was honored one year by a gift of 6000 drachmae.

The history of the sanctuary of Actium was similar to that of many others in ancient Greece. Delphi, Olympia, Eleusis and many sanctuaries in Asia Minor, were all at first small, local religious centres. The cult and worship were as a rule organized and at first maintained by pious and devout individuals. As the cult grew and drew more and more followers, the state interfered, trying to lay its hand on the management and the finances. Later the confederations did the same thing with the civic cults, and so did the kings and emperors, both Greek and Roman. The rela-

[16] L. Ziehen, Leges Graec. Sacr. II, no. 58, 99–102 = IG, V, 1, 1390.
[17] Lines 45 f.

tions between a sanctuary and the state are well illustrated in a decree concerning the cult of Apollon in Ptoion (second century B.C.).[18] We read in this document that the sanctuary is administered jointly 1.) by the prophet, 2.) by the priest, 3.) by the city of Acraephiae, 4.) by the Boetian Confederation, and 5.) by the president of the festival games. Each member of this administrative body represents a new stage in the development and history of the sanctuary.

[18] L. Ziehen, op. cit., no. 70, 13–17.


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PRESBYTERS AND DISCIPLES OF THE LORD IN PAPIAS

Exegetic Comments on Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, III, 39.[1]

JOHANNES MUNCK

Aarhus University, Denmark

Papias of Hierapolis has suffered from the fact that his work, Exposition of the Words of the Lord, in five books, has been lost, and that so little or, if preferred, just so much, has been preserved, that the fragments confront us with difficult problems. These are many and may easily overshadow the text. The following comments are primarily of an exegetic nature and serve to shed light on Papias and his work.

It is reasonable to begin by giving a few facts about Papias, but this corresponds to giving a statement of the points on which there is disagreement. Papias was bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia in the second century A.D., but even his chronology is disputed. Does his ministry extend as far back as the second half of the first century, or does he belong solely to the second? He wrote a work in five books with the title Exposition of the Words of the Lord, but the contents of this monograph are likewise a source of contention. Does the work deal with the words of Jesus, or with Old Testament prophecies of Christ and his Church? Our most important sources for the study of Papias are the Fathers Irenæus and Eusebius, but they do not interpret him in the same way. It is thus natural that there should be disagreement as to Papias' relationship to the apostle John. Was Papias his disciple, or does his knowledge derive from disciples of the apostles, or merely from disciples of the disciples of the apostles?

I

The most important text dealing with Papias, not least because we can here be sure that we are reading the words he wrote, is to

[1] This article has appeared in Danish in the publication in honor of Hugo Odeberg (Svensk exegetik årsbok XXII–XXIII, 1957–1958, pp. 172–190). Appendix A has, however, been added here, as I was only later able to consider Lawlor's hypothesis.

be found in Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History III,39.[2] Eusebius begins by mentioning Papias' work,[3] its title, and the number of books it contains. He quotes the testimony of Irenæus, who describes Papias as a hearer of John, and a companion of Polycarp, a man of bygone days; but — continues Eusebius (39,2) — Papias himself reveals in his preface that he has not by any means heard or seen the apostles, but that he received the doctrines of the faith[4] from those who had known the apostles; Eusebius then quotes the relevant passage from the preface (39,3–4):

> "I will not hesitate for your benefit to set down side by side with the interpretations that which I in the past perfectly /[5] learnt from the presbyters and perfectly remember, and I / vouch for its truth. For I did not, like most men, take pleasure in those who / talk much, but in those who teach the truth, / nor in those who recall the strange commandments, but in those who recall the commandments that / have been given by the Lord to faith, and that derive from the very / Truth. And if then one came who had followed the presbyters, / I asked them concerning the words of the presbyters, what Andrew or / Peter or Philip or Thomas or James or John / or Matthew [6] or any other of the Lord's disciples had said, and that which Aristion / and John the presbyter, the Lord's disciples, say. For I held that I did not / have so much benefit from the books as / from (the) living and abiding voice."

Eusebius then interprets Papias' words as follows: Papias mentions two men called John (39,5), one together with the other apostles, and this is clearly the Evangelist, and then another John, who is mentioned after the apostles, and who follows on the heels of Aristion,[7] and is termed "presbyter." Eusebius next refers

[2] Schwartz' edition, GCS, vol. 9, 1–3 (1903–09); The Church History of Eusebius, by A. C. McGiffert (1890), (Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers, vol. I).

[3] Papias has been mentioned earlier II, 15, 2; III, 36, 2.

[4] Cf. preface l. 15: τῇ πίστει.

[5] The diagonal strokes mark the lines in the text of Eusebius in Schwartz' edition, viz. ll. 10–22.

[6] The division of the names into groups by the repetition of τέ is of no significance. See the earlier discussion in Carl L. Leimbach, Das Papiasfragment (1875), pp. 104 ff.

[7] This Aristion is otherwise unknown. Conybeare reported (The Expositor, 4th ser., vol. 8 (1893), pp. 241–254) that in an Armenian manuscript of the gospels in Edschmiatzin he had found a break before the longer conclusion to Mark, and a

(39,6) to a matter which is not related till later in his History, namely, that Dionysios of Alexandria says that there were two named John in Asia, and that there are two graves in Ephesus called John's Grave (H. E. VII, 25, 16). This other John may be the author of the Apocalypse (thus also Dionysios, H. E. VII, 25).[8] And Papias shows, continues Eusebius, 39, 7, that he has received the words of the apostles from those that followed them (namely above, preface ll. 10–12, and 16–20), but he says that he himself has heard Aristion and John the presbyter (cf. preface, ll. 19–20 and also ll. 10–12, but what Eusebius says is not explicitly stated in Papias' text). He mentions them by name and cites their traditions in his books. Of the accounts handed down to Papias[9] Eusebius cites (39, 8–10): the stay of the apostle Philip and his daughters in Hierapolis, the account given by the latter of a raising from the dead, and the saving of Judas Barsabas from a deadly poison (to which Eusebius adds an explanation as to who this Judas is). From an unwritten tradition (cf. preface, ll. 20–22) Papias learned otherwise unknown parables and doctrines of Jesus (39,11), including that of the Millennium (39,12). Eusebius will not deny that Papias depends on the accounts of the apostles here also, but he has misunderstood their words and taken their imagery far too literally. Eusebius believes he is entitled to charge Papias with such misunderstandings since it appears from his own words that he was of very low intelligence.[10]

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heading to this which ran: By the Presbyter Ariston (facsimile in H. B. Swete, The Gospel according to St. Mark (1902) opposite p. CIV). Conybeare assumed that the passage is a tradition from Aristion deriving from Papias' work, and he has ibid., 5th ser., vol. 2 (1895), pp. 401–421, defended his theory against Resch and Zahn. Incidentally it is believed that Aristion is intended in Const. ap. VII, 46 (MPG I, 1053, 4 and 5) (Ἀρίστων) as the name of the first and the third bishop of Smyrna.

[8] Eusebius leaves it as an open question, however, both here and in III, 25, 2 and 4.

[9] Possibly by Aristion and John the presbyter, but this is not explicitly stated.

[10] As Chapman has rightly noticed (reported by Rendel Harris in Testimonies II (1920), pp. 119–120), Eusebius exploits Papias' modest estimate of his own abilities for polemical purposes. It was the convention for the author of an early Christian treatise to declare in the preface that he was no writer, could not compose a book, etc. See Irenæus, Adv. hær. I, præfat.; Clem. Alex., Strom. I, ch. 1; cf. Eusebius, H. E. III, 24, 5, where it is related of the Evangelists Matthew and John that it is with reluctance that they have begun to write (cf. Canon Muratorianus, ll. 9–16), and VI, 13, 9, where Clement has been compelled by his friends to hand down to posterity a written account of the traditions he heard from the old pres-

But because Papias belongs to a former age[11] many clerical writers have followed him in expressing erroneous beliefs of this kind, including Irenæus (39,13). After this severe criticism of Papias' unfortunate traditions Eusebius mentions that Papias' work contains other accounts of the sayings of the Lord that derive from Aristion and traditions from John the presbyter. Readers who require further details are referred to these by Eusebius (39,14). He himself merely quotes the traditions recounted by Papias concerning the Gospel of St. Mark and the Gospel of St. Matthew (39,15–16). Finally, he mentions (39,17) that Papias has used testimony from 1 John and 1 Peter, and that he has an account of a woman who was accused of many sins before Jesus.[12] This is also to be found, adds Eusebius, in the Gospel according to the Hebrews.

II

This mention of Papias' work in Eusebius' History is, as can be seen, entirely one-sided. From the preface Eusebius has selected Papias' modest description of himself, and turned it to a polemical use (39,13), but otherwise he has omitted everything that does not concern the problem of Papias' relation to already existing tradition, the apostles, and the presbyters. We can see this from the first sentence in the passage that Eusebius has cut

byters. Thus through Eusebius' malicious argument we may assume that we know a part of the preface otherwise lost.

[11] H. E. III, 39, 1, Eusebius quotes Irenæus' description of Papias as an ἀρχαῖος ἀνήρ, and here in 39, 13 he speaks of his ἀρχαιότης, which Eusebius does not deny. And in fact Eusebius places Papias in the 3rd book of his History, where he begins with the apostles' journeys throughout the earth after the death of James and the destruction of Jerusalem, and continues with events during the reign of Domitian and Trajan (concluded IV, 2), including 1 Clem., the persecution under Domitian, and the apostle John, the order of the gospels, the death of John and Philip, Ignatius and his letters, and Papias' writings. This chronology shows that Eusebius did not doubt that Papias belonged to the earliest Christian period. Cf. Bartlet, Papias's "Exposition": its Date and Contents, Amicitiæ Corolla (1933), pp. 15–44, see pp. 20–23, and Gutwenger, Papias. Eine chronologische Studie, Zeitschr. f. kath. Theol. 69 (1947), pp. 385–416, see pp. 403–405.

[12] Conybeare also found in the above-mentioned Armenian gospel manuscript a version of the pericope (John 7, 53–8, 11) about a woman who "was taken in sins"; Jesus writes in the sand, and those present see "their many sins on the stones." Conybeare believes this to be the version known to Papias and the Gospel according to the Hebrews (The Expositor, 5th ser., vol. 2 (1895), pp. 405–409). Cf. Bacon, ibid., 6th ser., No. LXIII (1905), pp. 161–177.

out of the preface, probably near its conclusion.[13] Here Papias turns from speaking of the contents of his work, which of course according to the title contains expositions of the words of the Lord, and states that he will not hesitate to add to the interpretations that which he has learned from the presbyters. Unless we read attentively we may easily get the impression that Papias' work was a collection of traditions, and nothing else. This is due to Eusebius' interest in Papias as a link in a chain of tradition that is unimpeachable, and at the same time his eagerness to distinguish between the apostles and their disciples, and poor Papias on the other hand, with his low intelligence and terrible misunderstandings of the sound apostolic tradition.

What was the main question for Papias is therefore not the main question for Eusebius. The former wrote an exposition, to which he made additions from oral tradition. But Eusebius, who was interested only in the tradition behind Papias, has omitted all the rest of Papias' preface, and we must presume that this was the most important and lengthiest part. If only we had it, we should know both what it was Papias was expounding, and how he did it. As to the last point, the comment on Papias' misunderstanding of otherwise unknown sayings of Jesus (39,11–12) may help us to understand Papias as a scriptural interpreter. Presumably it is not only in the unknown, but also in the otherwise familiar sayings of Jesus that Papias betrayed his chiliastic outlook, and took quite literally expressions that to Eusebius were only metaphors.

In the same indirect way we may also learn something of the sayings Papias expounded in his five books. The very fact that Eusebius states (39,11) that Papias had obtained from an unwritten tradition some unknown parables and teachings of Jesus, and other things of a more legendary nature, indicates that except for these he was dealing with familiar parables and teachings, in other words, that Papias was expounding material which was available to Eusebius in the gospels.[14]

[13] Cf. Lightfoot, "Supernatural Religion." V. Papias of Hierapolis, in The Contemporary Review 26 (1875), pp. 377–403 and 828–856, see p. 389; Zahn in Forsch. z. Gesch. d. nt. Kanons 6 (1900), p. 131; Bartlet, op. cit., p. 31.

[14] Cf. Lightfoot, op. cit., p. 388.

On this particular point opinions have differed widely. It has been held that λόγια must mean Old Testament prophecies. This was Rendel Harris' view in Testimonies I–II, 1916–1920.[15] Matthew had assembled the original testimonia in Hebrew, and Papias, who states this (Eusebius H. E. III, 39, 16), discussed these Messianic promises in his work. Another view is that the λόγια collocated in Hebrew by Matthew were the Logia source (Q). This view has been very widely maintained in connection with the fondness for the Two Sources hypothesis displayed by most scholars.[16]

The significance of λόγια, both in the title of Papias' work and in his tradition concerning the Gospel of St. Matthew, must, however, be sought by a comparison with the other passages where Papias uses the word. And here there can be no doubt, as G. Kittel has correctly observed,[17] that in his statement about the Gospel of St. Mark Papias uses τὰ κυριακὰ λόγια in the sense of "what the Lord has said or done." This makes it clear that Matthew also, of whom we are told that "he collocated τὰ λόγια," collected both the words and the acts of Jesus in his gospel. And similarly Papias in his work treated the whole gospel tradition, both words and acts.

III

In his preface Papias explains the purpose of his work — namely, to expound that which the Lord has said or done; he then explains his method of exposition, which was presumably more or less on the lines mentioned above, however Papias himself might have expressed it; after this he proceeds to speak of those traditions which he has not hesitated to add to his work. It is important that we should consider the nature of this material before

[15] See especially vol. I, chs. 12–15, and vol. II, ch. 11. Rendel Harris cites in support F. C. Burkitt, The Gospel History and its Transmission (1906), pp. 124–128.

[16] Thus for example T. W. Manson, The Gospel according to St. Matthew, Bull. of the John Rylands Library 29 (1945–46), pp. 392–428. This contains a survey of the meaning of λόγια from LXX to Tatian (pp. 411–428). A similar survey is given by Lightfoot, op. cit., pp. 399–403, and Doeve in Studia Paulina (1953), pp. 111–123.

[17] ThWB IV, 144–145, cf. Zahn, Gesch. d. nt. Kanons I (1888), pp. 857–861. Lightfoot mentions this agreement in usage p. 402, but with reservations as regards the argument.

approaching those lines that have given rise to so much discussion about Papias' relationship to the apostles.

Papias himself learned from the presbyters, as he relates in the preface ll. 10–12. He received tradition direct from the presbyters, whoever they may be. Eusebius repeats the names Aristion and John the presbyter (39,7 and 14), but it is a natural assumption that the presbyters comprise a large circle of people not necessarily living in the same place. In his younger days Papias probably travelled,[18] and learned directly from the presbyters. What he learned, he remembered, for this is an oral tradition first recorded by Papias.[19] The presbyters were bearers of oral traditions, and Papias prefers their instruction to "the books." As what he is interpreting is a written gospel tradition, we here as elsewhere in the period encounter delight in the oral tradition as a supplement to the Scriptures. Thus Philo says in Vita Mosis I, § 4 (ed. Cohn et Wendland, IV, 120, 4–8) that he will tell the story of Moses as he has learned it, both from the holy Scriptures, and from presbyters (here also referring to bearers of tradition) of the Jewish people (*μανθάνω παρὰ* as in Papias);[20] it being his custom to put what he has heard together with what he has read, in the belief that this gives a deeper insight into the life of Moses.

Papias compares various others unfavorably with the presbyters, as he later rates the books lower than oral tradition.[21] At-

[18] His name suggests that he is a native of Hierapolis. It is used for the Hierapolitan Zeus (Lightfoot, op. cit., pp. 385–386), and is common in the neighborhood (Lightfoot and W. H. P. Hatch, Über den Namen Papias, ZNW 12 (1911), p. 83).

[19] This oral tradition may be illustrated by Irenæus' letter to Florinus (quoted by Eusebius, H. E. V, 20, 6), in which he mentions "those speeches Polycarp made to the people, how he described his intercourse with John, and with the others, who had seen the Lord, and how he remembered (*ἀπεμνημόνευεν*) their words and what he had heard from them about the Lord, both of his mighty deeds and his teaching. As one who had received this from eye-witnesses to 'the Word of Life,' Polycarp recounted all in accordance with the Scriptures." Here we have a picture of Papias, if like Polycarp he had chosen to be an oral bearer of tradition; but the passage quoted also throws light on a disciple of the presbyters who, like Papias, embarks on writing.

[20] Cf. Josephus, Contra Apionem II, §§ 10–14 (ed. Niese, 2nd ed. (1955), vol. V, 55, 10–56, 5).

[21] In connection with these words, Kleist points out (Ancient Christian Writers 6 (1948), p. 204, note 7) that the Greeks preferred the spoken, living word to written words, and quotes Plato, Phaedr. 275 D-E. But this text, to which Clem. Alex. refers Strom. I, 9, 1–2 (ed. Stählin, II, 7, 15–27) and I, 14, 4 (II, 11, 6–9), is far above Papias' level.

tempts have of course been made to discover at whom this criticism is aimed. And of course the usual whipping-boys have been selected. F. C. Baur maintained that a man who attached so much importance to the tradition of Jesus' teaching and person must be thinking of Paul and his followers when he speaks of "those who recall the strange commandments"; [22] and now it is often held to be the gnostic heresies that Papias is attacking.[23] But the expressions used are so conventional that it seems unreasonable to seek opponents outside the religious community of which Papias himself was a member. Who, even in our time, is not acquainted with those who say much, or who recall strange commandments, and who does not remember books that were not equal to the speech of presbyters one had heard? No, all these are conventional remarks, that make us nod eagerly, and say, "the same here."

Later in life, Papias was separated from the presbyters — presumably he was living in Hierapolis — but he still tried to partake of their tradition. Every time the town was visited — and Hierapolis lay near Laodicea, where the highway from the Euphrates to Ephesus was crossed by a road from Attalia to Sardes, which went on to Smyrna and Pergamum — by those who had followed the presbyters, wherever these might be living, Papias questioned them as to the words of the presbyters, namely, what seven of the Lord's disciples, who are mentioned by name, or any other of the Lord's disciples, had said. A relative clause is added: and that which Aristion and John the presbyter, the Lord's disciples, say. Since these two are not included among "or any other of the Lord's disciples" in the preceding sentence, although they are expressly described as the Lord's disciples, there must be some reason for mentioning them separately.[24] This can be found in

[22] Paulus (1845), p. 221.

[23] Already Lightfoot, op. cit., p. 391. Against his theory it must be objected that Eusebius, H. E. IV, 7, places the rise of the gnostic heresies in the reign of Hadrian, and names among their opponents — in addition to Agrippa Castor in 7,6 — Hegesippus and Justin in Ch. 8. If Papias opposed heretical exegetic works, as assumed by Lightfoot, there is at all events no mention of the fact in that passage in Eusebius where we would expect to find it.

[24] One is tempted to delete "disciples of the Lord" after the last two names, as several have done, see e.g. T. Mommsen, Papianisches ZNW 3 (1902), 156–159; but *lectio difficilior* is to be preferred.

the different tenses of the verbs used (εἶπεν and λέγουσιν). While the other disciples of the Lord no longer speak, these two are still living sources of tradition.

IV

Two expressions in this difficult text are of decisive importance for its interpretation. They are "presbyter," and "disciple of the Lord." It is furthermore important to establish that the seven disciples of the Lord mentioned by name (ll. 17–19) are all apostles, but that this is not stated by Papias.[25] They are described as the Lord's disciples, but this term is also applied to Aristion and John the presbyter.

In the gospels μαθηταί indicates the disciples of Jesus in a narrower and a wider sense, while in the Acts it is used to describe the Christians.[26] Apart from these writings the term is not used in the New Testament. Later it is on occasion used for the Christians, since the post-apostolic church applies the gospel term for the disciples of Jesus to its members.[27] Another application of the gospel terminology may result in the use of disciple for a personal disciple of Jesus, often in such a way that disciple and apostle are used indiscriminately.[28] In Ignatius the word may also mean a "martyr." [29] This usage also has precedents in the gospels, most

[25] Reservations may be made in the case of James, who could be the Lord's brother, and of Philip, who could be the evangelist, but both are uncertain. But if, as assumed below, Papias distinguishes clearly between John the apostle and John the presbyter, it is best to take both James and Philip (cf. Eusebius, H. E. III, 39, 9) to be apostles.

[26] Rengstorf's article μαθητής in ThWB IV, 417–464 maintains that a traditional principle is lacking in Jesus' disciples. This thesis has recently been contested by H. Riesenfeld, The Gospel Tradition and its Beginnings (1957).

[27] Ignatius, Magn. 9,1; 10,1; Pol. 2,1; in Clem. Alex., e.g., Paid. I,30,1 (I,108,7).

[28] In the Gospel of St. John the word apostle is not used of the closest disciples of Jesus, and Papias seems to follow the same usage when he applies the expression "the Lord's disciples" to seven apostles. It is presumably the same Asia Minor usage we encounter in Irenæus (references from whom are first given with book, chapter, page and line according to Stieren, then with volume, page and line according to Harvey), when he mentions the apostle John as the Lord's disciple, Adv. hær. II,22,5 (ed. Stieren I,1853 p.359,18; ed. Harvey, 1857, I,331,8); III,1,1 (423,18; II,6,3); III,3,4 (435,9; II,13,10); III,11,1 (462,13; II, 40,6, and 463, 9; II,40,20 f.). Clement of Alexandria and the gnostic texts vary between disciple and apostle, with a majority of the former in the gnostic texts. The same alternation is to be found in the scanty material in the Epistula apostolorum.

[29] Ephes. 1,2; Trall. 5,2; Rom. 4,2; 5,3; Pol. 7,1.

clearly in Luke 14,27, "Whosoever doth not bear his cross, and come after me, cannot be my disciple."

The combination *οἱ κυρίου μαθηταί* found in Papias is rare. In the New Testament it occurs in Acts 9,1, concerning the Christians. In Clem. Alex., Pro. 112,2 (I,79,16); Strom. II,15,3 (II, 120,19), the term is used for the Christians. The same applies to Strom. VII,60,1 (III,44,1) concerning the gnostic, where, however, the more scholastic sense of *μαθηταί* also makes itself felt. Incidentally, the other instances of the word "disciples" approach this sense of the word, owing to Clement's didactic view of the world and mankind. In the case of Irenæus, we have already (note 28) cited passages in which John is termed the Lord's disciple. This term seems to be almost identical with "apostle" in Irenæus, as can be seen from II,22,5 (359,18; I,331,8), "Ioannem discipulum Domini," followed on p. 359,23; I, 331,14–15, by, "non solum Ioannem, sed et alios apostolos viderunt," [30] to which we have a parallel in fr.III (826,15–17; II,476,5–7). Similarly, the passage on p. 480,3; II,57,26, of III,12,5, in which it is stated that Peter and John returned "ad reliquos coapostolos et discipulos Domini," may, taken together with p. 480,21–22; II,58, 11–12 show the same correspondence between apostle and the Lord's disciple; but the text can also be read as referring to two groups within the earliest Church — the apostles, and the other Christians. If so, the text is evidence that the term can signify Christians in the earliest days of the Church. Mention is then made of the personal disciples of Jesus, who according to p. 480, 23–25; II,58, 12–13 have been made perfect by the Holy Ghost after the Lord's ascension. Thus it seems possible to show the existence of three senses of "the Lord's disciples," signifying respectively "Christians," apostles, and disciples of Jesus during his life on earth.

V

It remains to illustrate the term presbyter from the remaining ecclesiastical usage. If we begin with Irenæus, where there has been a tendency to see the figure of Papias behind the references

[30] II,20,4–5 alternates between disciple and apostle, see 351,30; I,323,22; 352,5; I,323,26–27, and 18; I,324,2–3.

to the Elders, it is important to stress that presbyter (*senior*) means an old and reverend person who is cited with respect, whether he is an ecclesiastical writer, or the source of an oral tradition, or one who hands on an earlier tradition. The vagueness of this definition is intentional, as against the earlier tendency to make a presbyter the bearer of a tradition and an apostle's disciple.[31] As regards the first limitation it is important to make it clear that a number of the quotations from the presbyters derive from written sources,[32] and as regards the last, the repeated addition of "the apostles' disciples" is a clear indication that this fact is not to be implicitly understood in the term "presbyter." [33]

In Clement of Alexandria "presbyter" is used of Christian bearers of tradition, but only once within his literary works, and

[31] This has been the initial assumption of many, who have not attempted to justify it. But John Chapman, John the Presbyter and the Fourth Gospel (1911), has investigated the usage in Irenæus and Eusebius and holds that "presbyter" has "a technical meaning — primitive subapostolic witnesses who were not Apostles nor disciples of the Lord but usually disciples of Apostles" (p. 19, note 1).

[32] Presbyters (*seniores*) are quoted in the singular or the plural: in Adv. Hær. I,15,6 (192,14; I,155,14; 194,3; I,156,7) the unknown presbyter has carried on a controversy against the heretics; cf. IV, Præf. 2 (558,12; II,144,12–13), where presbyters are not expressly mentioned (ante nos . . . et quidem multo nobis meliores [a description elsewhere applied to the presbyters]). The *superior nobis* mentioned in III,17,4 (516,25; II,95,2) could be the writer referred to in I, Præf. 1,2 (6,1; I,3,6). Cf. also the anonymous *quidam* or *qui*: IV,4,2 (568,13; II,153,4), and IV,41,2 (709,7 f.; II,304,21). *Ex veteris quidam* is uncertain, because *veteres* often meant the men under the Old Covenant (thus IV,27,1 (648,3; II,239,2); IV,27,2 (651,23; II,242,5); cf. *antiqui* IV,31,1 (661,25; II,251,17), and cf. Clem. Alex., Strom. III,72,1 (ed. Stählin II,228,23); οἱ πρεσβύτεροι). The long passage IV,27–32, where a presbyter is often quoted, namely IV,27,1 (648,1; II,238,27; 650,27; II,241,8); 27,2 (651,23; II,242,5); 28,1 (654,24; II,244,26), where presbyters are discussed; 30,1 (658,15; II,248,5); 31,1 (661,25; II,251,17); 32,1 (664,5; II, 254,8–9), seems to be aimed at the gnostic heresies and to derive from a writer who is described as a presbyter, while the subject seems to continue into ch. 33. — Lightfoot, op. cit., p. 841, points out that a statement that the presbyters say etc. refers to something written, while "audivi a quodam presbytero," IV,27,1 f. (648,1; II,238,27); "sicut et presbyter dicebat," IV,30,1 (658,15; II,248,5); "Talia quaedam enarrans de antiquis presbyter, reficiebat nos et dicebat," IV, 31,1 (661,25; II,251,17); "senior apostolorum discipulus disputabat," IV,32,1 (664,5; II,254,8–9) refer to the conversations of the Elders. This correct observation leads to such difficulties, however (e.g., 648,1; II,238,27, cf. 650,27; II,241,8, and 651,23; II,242,5), that the question cannot be discussed here.

[33] A large group of early church writers and bearers of tradition known as presbyters includes a certain number of disciples of the apostles: Epideixis, ch. 3; Adv. hær. IV,32,1 (664,5; II,254,8–9); V,5,1 (728,5 f.; II,331,5); 36,2 (819,10; II,428,26); cf. V,36,1 (818,7; II,427,12 f.), including disciples of John, the Lord's disciple: II,22,5 (359,16 f.; I,331,7–8); cf. V,30,1 (799,17; II,406,10) where presbyters are not mentioned; V,33,3 (809,16; II,417,17–18). Immediately after the last passage Papias is quoted, as cited by Eusebius, H. E. III,39,1.

it is there doubtful whether Stählin is right in his interpretation.[34] Those of Clement's writings which are in the nature of notes or preliminary work, or which deal with the Scriptures or internal church problems, but of which only fragments are extant, contain several allusions to the presbyters. The interpretation of Pro. 113,1 mentioned above is corroborated by a comparison of Strom. I,11 (II,8,16 ff.) and Eclogae § 27,1 (III,144,26 ff.). In the literary treatise Clement speaks, in phrases borrowed from Plato's Phaedros, of the record he is about to set down of the words he was privileged to hear spoken by the blessed and really eminent men whom he met in the course of his travels. He refers to five different teachers and mentions their place of origin. His search stopped in Egypt with that teacher who has been identified as early as Eusebius with Pantainos. He is described in the succeeding passage as being a Sicilian and an interpreter of the Scriptures.[35] These teachers of Clement sowed in him the apostolic seed which had been handed down unchanged from teacher to pupil from the holy apostles Peter, James, John, and Paul.

In the Eclogae, set down in writing for internal use, it is said of these teachers in § 27 (III,144,26 ff.) that the presbyters did not write, but devoted all their strength to oral instruction in the traditions. Here also Clement speaks of the transition from this oral tradition to the written record made by him, and defends his action in making it. Both here and in Ecl. 11 (III,139,20)[36] his teachers appear as οἱ πρεσβύτεροι, but a comparison with Strom.

[34] It is in Protreptikos § 113,1 (I,79,25) that Clement writes of philosophy that, as the men of old (οἱ πρεσβύτεροι) say, it is good counsel for a long time, since it pursues an eternal love (ἔρως) of wisdom. But as in § 112, Clement contrasts this with the teachings of the Word, which make it unnecessary to pursue the teachings of mankind, and to give heed to Athens and the rest of Hellas and Ionia also. Thus the quotation does not derive from Clement's Christian teachers (as Stählin believes when he refers to Harnack, Überlieferung, pp. 292 f.), but from men of an earlier age, such as Aristotle or Poseidonios, who have exhorted men to philosophize. This cannot be proved, owing to the fragmentary state of the extant Protreptikos literature, but the idea cannot have been alien to a treatise of this type. In Alkinoos' summary of Plato's philosophy (Platon ed. C. F. Hermann (Teubner), vol. 6, 1873, pp. 152–189), we find at the beginning of ch. I (p. 152,2), φιλοσοφία ἐστὶν ὄρεξις σοφίας.

[35] Cf. W. Telfer, J. of Theol. Stud. 28, 1927, pp. 169–170. The words τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκεῖνο τὸ κεχαριτωμένον, Strom. I,14,1 (II,10,18) presumably also refer to Pantainos.

[36] Cf. fr.8 = Eusebius, H.E. VI,14,5–7 (III,197,17 ff.) and fr.25 = H.E. VI, 13,9 (III,216,5). Cf. Eusebius, H.E. II,9,2 (τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ) and fr.48 (III,224,14): οἱ περὶ Πάνταινον.

I,11 shows that they are teachers in completely different places, whose only point of contact is their common apostolic tradition. Elsewhere Clement refers to the sayings of individual presbyters, thus Ecl. 50,1 (III,150,21); fr.22 (III,201,26) and fr.24 (Adumbrationes) (III,210,1). In Ecl. 56,2 Clement refers to Pantainos, citing a hermeneutic rule from that teacher in his interpretation of Ps. 18.[37]

If we compare the use of the word presbyter by Papias, Irenæus, and Clement, we find that the first and the last agree most closely with each other. In their writings the presbyters are teachers, whose oral tradition is handed on to the pupil. In Clement's writings also, in spite of the later date, the presbyters have preserved the link with the days of the apostles. In Clement the presbyters are interpreters of the Scriptures, while in Papias they recount those traditions which form part of the oral material, and which Papias himself — probably for the first time in a literary form — connects with scriptural exegesis.

Irenæus has preserved the anonymity of the presbyters most closely, referring to them merely as "presbyter" or "presbyters." Clement, we notice, preserves the anonymity in his literary writings, while he occasionally mentions Pantainos by name in his other works. Papias, according to Eusebius, gave Aristion and John the presbyter as his sources (H. E. III,39,7). Irenæus on the other hand uses the word most loosely of the three. It can mean both a written and an oral source, and it is not clear to what generation they are to be assigned.

Before we turn to the interpretation of Papias' words, attention should also be drawn to the later development in the significance of the word.[38] Papias describes his teachers as presbyters. After his day, Irenæus described the men of the generation to which Papias belonged as presbyters. Later Hippolytus, in Refutatio, etc., calls Irenæus "the blessed presbyter," VI,42 and 55 (ed. P. Wendland, pp. 173,12 and 189,11).[39] Eusebius also mentions

[37] Cf. Eusebius' remarks V,11,2; VI,13,2. "The blessed presbyter," ibid., 14,4, is not necessarily Pantainos, just as "the tradition of the old presbyters," ibid., 14,5, does not necessarily come from the Catechetical School in Alexandria (see my "Untersuchungen über Klemens von Alexandria" (1933), pp. 173 ff.).

[38] Cf. Lightfoot, op. cit., pp. 379–380.

[39] For Origen's use of the word see Zahn, Forsch.z.Gesch.d.nt.Kanons 6 (1900), p. 58, note 2.

Irenæus among "the old presbyters and writers of the Church" (H. E. V,8,1). Thus "presbyter" clearly means "authority and antiquity," as Lightfoot so rightly observes on p. 380.

VI

This last reflection takes us straight on to Papias' text, since it is obvious from the above that the word presbyters does *not* mean disciples of the apostles, although it can quite well be used to describe them also when the context makes it clear. And this vaguer definition, in which antiquity and authority are the basic meaning, shows that we cannot exclude the possibility that "presbyters" might be used of apostles, even though there is no instance of it in the later literature. But this could in fact not occur in the later literature, but only in Papias' generation.[40] The scarcity of sources compels us to consider what might have been possible. Hence great difficulties, necessitating a reconsideration, are involved in both the interpretations of Papias' text which have hitherto formed the subject of isagogic discussion: namely, that the apostle John is mentioned twice, or that there are two men of that name, of whom the other, John the presbyter, is the author of the Gospel and the Epistles, and lived to a great age in Ephesus.

It is most natural to assume that "the words of the presbyters" in l.17 are identical with what was said by the seven apostles and possibly by other disciples of the Lord, and with what is said by the two other disciples of the Lord whose names are given. Thus nine presbyters altogether are here mentioned by name. This was how Eusebius interpreted Papias' text, as appears from 39,7: Papias acknowledges that he has received the words of the apostles from those who have followed them (*παρηκολουθηκότων*, cf. the same verb in l.16), but he says that he himself has heard Aristion and John the presbyter. This is how Eusebius interprets ll.16–20. In this interpretation he has not taken into account ll.10–12, which mention a personal discipular relationship to the presbyters. And he buttresses up his assumption about Aristion and John the presbyter, drawn from the words of Papias in

[40] As Lightfoot correctly observes, op. cit., p. 379, "The term with him is a synonym for the Fathers of the Church in the first generation."

ll.19–20,[41] by pointing out (39,7) that he often mentions their names in his books, where he recounts their traditions.

Eusebius has not been fair to Papias. Like other, later historians, he has approached his source with a perfectly clear conception of what was right. And even though he is a more critical reader than Irenæus it is not certain that he understood Papias better. He lacked the sympathy and patience which an exegete and historian should display towards his sources. Hence it must be permissible to take Eusebius' remarks here as an interpretation of Papias' preface, and a poor interpretation at that. But his view that the presbyters included the apostles also is probably right. Papias' teachers in earlier days were presbyters in the wider sense of the term, and within the same circle were seven apostles, who were no longer alive when he sought further traditions in Hierapolis, and two other "disciples of the Lord" who were still living at that time. If we collate ll.10–12 with ll.16–20, Eusebius having taken only the latter into account, we come to the same conclusion as Irenæus, that Papias also learned directly from the presbyters mentioned in ll.16–20, and this may have been Irenæus' reading of the lines quoted by Eusebius.

It is true that the two Fathers knew far more than we do, since they read — or could have read — the whole of Papias' work, and in addition to this Irenæus must have known a good deal about Papias' generation through his connection with Asia Minor,

[41] In "Papias and the Four Gospels," Scottish Journal of Theology 9 (1956), pp. 46–62, Annand assumes on p. 46 that Papias is enumerating three things in his preface: 1) what he learned from the presbyters; 2) what the disciples of the presbyters related, and 3) what Aristion and John the presbyter say. Thus ἅ τε Ἀριστ. κτλ. depends on συγκατατάξαι in l.11, and καὶ ὅσα κτλ. in l.10 is taken up by εἰ δέ που κτλ. in l.16, and later by ἅ τε Ἀρ. in l.19. In addition Annand believes that Eusebius has understood the opening lines of the preface to concern "sayings *derived* from the elders." Lambot, "Les Presbytres de 'L'Exegesis' de Papias," Revue Bénédictine 43 (1931), pp. 116–123, see p. 117, holds Eusebius to have interpreted Papias as meaning that not only the presbyters mentioned, but Aristion and John the presbyter also, hand on what the apostles said. ἅ then introduces an explicative relative clause in apposition to the interrogative clause immediately preceding it. And τε-καί thus stands for "both Aristion and John the presbyter." It is better to assume with E. Mayser, Grammatik d. griech. Papyri aus d. Ptolemäerzeit II,1 (1926), pp. 78–79 and II,3,1934, pp. 52–53, that the direct interrogative pronoun and the relative pronoun can be substituted for each other, so that ἅ is here used in an indirect interrogative clause, parallel with the preceding sentence. In that case τε connects the ἅ-clause with the preceding sentence (cf. Kühner-Gerth II (1904), § 519,2 (p. 242)).

especially through Polycarp. Nevertheless, it may be of importance here to disregard all this, which cannot lead to greater clarity, being merely guesswork. Let us instead assume that the interpretation given here describes what Irenæus found in Papias' preface, and what made him call Papias "John's hearer." Eusebius found something different because he was interested in the otherwise unknown presbyter John.

On the other hand, Eusebius probably remains right in thinking that there were two men called John, although it is not certain that the other lived in Ephesus. The reason given him by Dionysios for such an assumption is without value. But the attempts that have been made to identify John the apostle with "John the presbyter" in ll.18–20 must be rejected. It would be unnatural to describe the same person in this way with an interval of barely more than a line.[42] There seems to be no reason for such an artificial device, when it would have been quite sufficient for Papias to have referred to the apostle together with Aristion. Nor can it successfully be argued that "John the presbyter" is the aged John at Ephesus, who wrote both the Gospel and the Epistles, of which the second and third Epistles are stated to have been written by "the Presbyter." [43] It is a mistake to think that a man can be known both as "the Presbyter," used as a title of distinction for the venerable leader of the Church in Asia, and at the same time as "John the presbyter." A title without a name cannot in other contexts be combined with a name. Gladstone was known as "the Grand Old Man," but certainly never as "the grand old man Gladstone." [44] We must assume that the other John, who was both a "disciple of the Lord" and a "presbyter," but not an apostle (nor an apostle's disciple), being the only duplicate in the list of names, had to be distinguished from his great namesake by a description that indicated that this was John the non-apostle. Since "presbyter" in the sense of an authority from the past would apply to both, the word must here indicate that the second John held the office of presbyter within the church.

[42] See Appendix A.

[43] On this point scholars, who otherwise differ, agree. It is maintained both by those who believe the apostle to be mentioned twice, and by those who hold that "John the presbyter," as distinct from the apostle, is that John who wrote the Gospel and the Epistles and lived to a ripe old age.

[44] Contrary to Chapman, who uses this particular example, but wrongly (p. 39).

VII

One difficulty remains. It is difficult to distinguish between the two terms "presbyters" and "disciples of the Lord." As has been seen above, the latter can mean "Christians," "apostles," and "personal disciples of Jesus." As the first sense is out of the question here, where it is a case of particular persons with a special qualification, and as the two last mentioned persons are not apostles, the third sense must be preferred. The difficulty is then that "presbyters," in the sense found in Irenæus and later, is not easily distinguished from "the disciples of the Lord" in Papias; for at an early period "presbyters," in the sense of authorities of an earlier day, can hardly be distinguished from apostles and other personal disciples of Jesus. This is only possible if in Papias' time other presbyters were known who, although they belonged to the earliest times, yet had not emigrated from Palestine, and consequently had not been the personal disciples of Jesus. It is within the mission to the heathen, in the persons of Paul and his colleagues from the Jewish diaspora and the heathen world, that such presbyters might have been found. If this is correct, then the presbyters comprise the widest circle of authorities from the older generation. Among the presbyters are men who have been personal disciples of Jesus, and in Papias' preface it is only they who are of interest, because Papias here states his sources for the oral traditions from Palestine, namely, the emigrant Palestinian disciples of Jesus. The preface states these sources in order to show the authenticity of the tradition recounted in the book. It is natural to assume that Papias, when as early as ll.10–12 he mentions that he has been the disciple of presbyters in his youth, is referring either to some of the nine presbyters named in ll.16–20, or at least to men of the same category.

Thus even in his youth as the disciple of presbyters Papias received oral traditions of importance for his work. Some of these presbyters, together with others, were later the sources of further traditions through those who, like himself, had for a time followed one or more presbyters. In this period seven apostles are concerned, as well as a number of other "disciples of the Lord" whom he does not mention by name, and Papias adds the names

of two presbyters and "disciples of the Lord" who were still active at this later period. In Papias' preface the presbyters seem chiefly to be regarded in their aspect as teachers, as he speaks of both his own and of others' discipleship under them; but this aspect, which closely approaches the usage of Clement, but is not found in Irenæus, need not be fundamental to "presbyters." Presumably Papias also could conceive of presbyters who in addition were "disciples of the Lord," but who did not teach.

VIII

The above interpretation of Papias' preface has the further advantage of agreeing with the chronological data available in his case. Attention has already been called to Eusebius' estimate of Papias' chronology. And his own mention of two personal disciples of Jesus who were still active when he was collecting material for his work makes it clear that the period concerned was before 100 A.D., and can hardly have extended beyond this date. This being so, it is natural to agree with several recent contributions in placing the year of Papias' birth at about 60 A.D.[45]

Appendix A

Another explanation of the difficulties in the Papias quotation has been given by Lawlor in Eusebius on Papias, Hermathena XIX, 1922, pp. 167–222. He maintains that Eusebius in his History often omits portions of the text he is quoting, and on p. 207, note 2 he gives a number of examples of this. After *ἕτερος τῶν τοῦ κυρίου μαθητῶν* Lawlor assumes an omission. This avoids the use of the word *πρεσβύτερος* three times in one sentence. Moreover, Eusebius reports that Papias said that he had heard Aristion and John the presbyter, while Papias, if the quotation is complete, says nothing of this. These and other arguments (pp. 207–210) lead Lawlor to the following conclusion (p. 210), "I suggest therefore that Eusebius omitted a portion of the text, which contained a verb by which the antecedent of *ἅ* was governed, and also one or more personal names. The omitted clause or clauses may be supposed to have made the direct statement that Papias had heard Aristion and the elder John." The interpretation I have given above of the Papias text and Irenæus' and Eusebius' explanation of it seems to me more natural and has the advantage of not necessitating any change in the text as transmitted. Furthermore,

[45] G. M. Perella, Il testo di San Papia circa "Giovanni l'anziano," Divus Thomas (Piacenza), 43 (1940), pp. 47–56; cf. J. Vernon Bartlet, op. cit. (1933), E. Gutwenger, op. cit. (1947) and R. Annand, op. cit. (1956) (even earlier). Of other recent literature (see e.g., Altaner, Patrologie[8], p. 84), which I regret I have not had the opportunity to read, I should like to mention in particular Donovan in Irish Ecclesiastical Record (1928), pp. 337–350 and 1931, pp. 124–137 and 483–500.

there is a great difference between the omission Lawlor suggests Eusebius has made in a quotation which he immediately afterwards comments on in detail, and the examples in Lawlor's note of omissions in quotations from the first three books of Eusebius' History. They are slightly abridged quotations from the Bible (I,2,3; 2,14; 2,15; 2,25), from Josephus (II,23,21; III,6,13; 8,4; 9,1; 10,5), and a single quotation from respectively Irenæus (III,23,3) and Justin's Apology (II,13,3). The Josephus quotation III,9,1 is in my opinion accurately quoted, and in another case, I,13,21, Lawlor assumes that a passage of some length has been omitted, not that the quotation has been abridged in the same way as he suggests in the case of the Papias quotation. The Justin quotation II,13,3, in which there is both omission and addition, is of no great significance in this connection because the text of Justin has suffered in transmission. Altogether it must be said that the ascertained omissions make no difference to the sense of the quotation. The examples given, therefore, do not make it probable that abridgment of the Papias quotation has changed the meaning of the text.

In this article Lawlor refers also to his earlier treatise, The Hypomnemata of Hegesippus in Eusebiana, Essays on the Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea, 1912, pp. 1–107. Here Lawlor tries to reconstruct two long passages from the 5th book of Hegesippus' Memoirs, which Eusebius has broken up into fragments and inserted into his Ecclesiastical History as he chose. This is the case in, for example, II,23, 4–18 of the History, the story of the martyrdom of James, which Eusebius expressly says is taken from the 5th book of Hegesippus' Memoirs. Lawlor attempts to prove that this quotation from Hegesippus is not complete, since a number of statements by Epiphanius are said to be derived from Hegesippus and to have been taken from this particular passage, of which Eusebius quotes only an abridged version. Not all the material in Lawlor's treatise on Hegesippus has a bearing on the special problem that concerns us here, namely, whether Eusebius made omissions in his quotations. Thus Eusebius' accounts of Hegesippus are of no interest. And Lawlor's attempt to reconstruct the text of Hegesippus with the aid of Eusebius and Epiphanius, and elsewhere with the aid of Hegesippus' quotations, accounts of Hegesippus, and other passages in Eusebius that may derive from Hegesippus, can only be a hypothesis that cannot be proved. But weighty arguments can be advanced against his theories: 1) The Hegesippus quotation H.E. II, 23, 4–18 is clearly a corrupt text (cf. E. Schwartz, Zu Eusebius Kirchengeschichte, ZNW 4, 1903, pp. 48–61, and my Paulus und die Heilsgeschichte, 1954, pp. 108–109), and there is reason to believe that Eusebius did not have access to Hegesippus' work in a form corresponding to its original text. This is obviously an insurmountable obstacle to a reconstruction. It is also an insurmountable obstacle to proving that Eusebius made omissions in his quotations from Hegesippus. 2) With Eusebius dependent upon a corrupt text of Hegesippus, it is difficult to suppose that later Christian writers have not been dependent upon Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History, but have instead used Hegesippus himself. If with Lawlor it be maintained that later writers such as Epiphanius must have obtained material from Hegesippus independently of Eusebius, it would be more reasonable to assume that they had access to Hegesippus through other writers who, like Eusebius, had quoted parts of his work. But in that case it is difficult to distinguish clearly between the miscellaneous material of such anthologies and the original, or an already corrupt text of Hegesippus. And the difficulties increase if the aim is to make it probable that Eusebius' text suffers from omissions in the quotations. 3) By the arguments he uses in the reconstruction of Hegesippus, Lawlor has renounced the basis of his research, which was correct. At the beginning of his treatise he shows that Hegesippus' work is not historical, but an Apology for the Faith against unbelievers, for orthodoxy against misbelievers (p. 3). But later he attempts to find a connection of a historical kind between the separate Hegesippus quotations (occasionally reservations are made, however, e.g. p. 55, cf. p. 60). But Hegesippus' work is

of an apologetical nature, and the historical information quoted or referred to by Eusebius must be assumed to be cited in connection with Hegesippus' arguments against the heretics, as can be seen, for instance, in the History III,32,2, where Eusebius reports that Hegesippus refers to the trial of Symeon in connection with his mention of certain heretics. It must, therefore, be assumed that traditions about historical personages crop up in Hegesippus' theological argumentation in the same way as they do in Irenæus or Clement of Alexandria. In spite of his correct basis, Lawlor's arguments in the reconstruction are in practice characterized by the wrong methodical assumption that Hegesippus was a historian and therefore arranged his material in a particular order, which Eusebius departed from, and in so doing omitted something in his quotations from Hegesippus. It can on the contrary be said that Eusebius has treated Hegesippus as he treated Papias. He had little interest in the apologetical argumentation of the former, and in the scriptural exegesis of the latter, but he has picked out what he holds to be the passages of historical value from every part of their works, and there is no proof that he changed his quotations.

On pp. 19–27, Vol. II, of Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea, The Ecclesiastical History and The Martyrs of Palestine, translated with introduction and notes by H. J. Lawlor and J. E. L. Oulton, 1928, reprinted 1954, the quotations are discussed, both the indirect quotations and summaries and the direct quotations. As regards the latter, a number of examples of omissions at the beginning or end of his quotations are first mentioned (pp. 20–22). Only two of these are of interest for our problem: H.E. III,23,3 contains a quotation from Irenæus II,22,5 (359,16–22; I, 331,11–13), in which *id ipsum . . . eis* is omitted. Here Eusebius' Greek text might, however, be the original one. In H.E. I,10,4 in a quotation from Josephus Arch. XVIII,2,2 (§§ 33 ff.) a ὅς has been omitted, which might seem to be an alteration made in connection with the position of the quotation in Eusebius' text. But this does not occur elsewhere. In fact, Lawlor's and Oulton's material shows that the quotations are inserted into Eusebius' text without being adapted to the new context, so that they both begin and end rather haphazardly. Then follows a new series of examples intended to show that Eusebius omits a portion of the text without giving notice to his readers that he has done so, not only at the beginning and end, but elsewhere also (p. 22). Of the eleven examples given here, H.E. I,13,21; II,23,21; III,8,4; and 9,1 have already been discussed at the beginning of this Appendix. III,39,4 is the Papias quotation we are discussing here. The remaining examples are mainly from writers whose works have been lost, and where an omission in the quotation is assumed to have been made. Only IV,11,5 and V,11,5, quotations from Irenæus and Clement of Alexandria, are definite new examples of omission. In the Irenæus quotation (226,15–16; I,183,10–11) 8 words are missing; in the Clement quotation what corresponds to three lines of the text (ed. Stählin II,9,1–3). Examples are then given of quotations beginning with a complete sentence, but without connection with the context (pp. 23–24). These are followed by examples showing that the quotations still preserve their references to the context from which they have been taken, although these make no sense in Eusebius' account (p. 24). It is, therefore, assumed that Eusebius used assistants to insert the quotations marked by him into his manuscript and that this explains the clumsiness with which the quotations have been transferred. Lastly we have on pp. 26–27 a number of examples of slips of the memory on the part of Eusebius, which led him to cite quotations as proofs, although they did not in fact prove the points in question.

Readers of the Ecclesiastical History are aware that Eusebius made mistakes, and the Papias quotation in III, 39, 3–4, with Eusebius' interpretation of it, is an example of this. But of the mass of valuable material from Lawlor and Oulton made use of here, only a few passages remain that can be used as evidence that Eusebius made omissions in his quotations. They are the quotations, mentioned

at the beginning of this Appendix, from the Bible in I,2,3; 2,14; 2,15; 2,25; and from Josephus in II,23,21; III,6,13; 8,4; 10,5; and the passages discussed later: I,10,2; III,23,3; IV,11,5; and V,11,4. These examples show that single words or as much as a few lines have been omitted by Eusebius in various quotations, but the total number of these passages, and the insignificance of the changes, which make no difference to the sense, are evidence in favor of Eusebius' reliability. Moreover, the remaining material shows that in spite of their many correct observations Lawlor and Oulton have ended by pronouncing a wrong opinion when they maintain on p. 23 that there are probably many as yet undiscovered abbreviations in the many quotations known to us only from transcripts in the Ecclesiastical History. In my opinion, their extensive material has shown it to be improbable that Eusebius commonly and deliberately changed his quotations. The many examples of awkward but correct quotation of the sources, without any suitable transition or conclusion, and with the original references retained though their meaning has been lost in the new context, show in fact that Eusebius was not the man to change his quotations in order to achieve a smoother text. And as the examples we have been able to give of omissions in the quotations show no change in the sense of the quotation, it must be considered improbable that Eusebius, as Lawlor suggests, should have omitted anything in the quotation from Papias' preface, and thus changed the meaning of it.

DANTE'S FIRM FOOT AND THE JOURNEY WITHOUT A GUIDE

JOHN FRECCERO
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

THE JOURNEY of the Divine Comedy begins with a conversion. The pilgrim "comes to" after somehow having lost his way in a dark wood. He looks up from that tangle and sees the rays of the sun striking upon a mountain-top, and knows that he must attain the summit. From that moment, the problem is no longer where to go, but rather how to get there, and the problem proves to be insoluble. Try as he may, he cannot achieve the goal which is the beginning and the cause of all joy, for three formidable beasts drive him back into the wood from which he has come, and he retreats, no longer able to help himself, exhausted, and very nearly defeated.

This attempted journey, the "corto andar" which the pilgrim never completes, contrasts with that longer journey, the circuitous route through hell and purgatory to the same objective. In recent years, we have come to understand more and more of the meaning of Dante's itinerary to God.[1] It is in the light of that meaning that this study will examine part of the prologue scene in order to understand the pilgrim's initial frustration, and to suggest a new reading for a traditionally obscure line. The allegory of this all-important scene seems clear when we see the prologue in the poem and the poem in the tradition.

The type of frustration felt by the pilgrim arises not from a defect of the mind, but rather from an incapacity of the will. It is not enough to know what must be done; one must also know how to do it. Ever since the Socratic equating of knowledge with virtue, moralists have objected that these are not the same.

[1] It should be noted that Dante's poem differs from the innumerable visions of the Middle Ages, and from ancient katabasis literature, in that it contains a consistent philosophical allegory applicable to this life. The studies of Charles S. Singleton have examined this pattern in the poem and situated it in its historical context, and it is to those studies that this paper owes its view of the poem as a whole. See Commedia: Elements of Structure, Dante Studies 1 (Cambridge, 1957), and Journey to Beatrice, Dante Studies 2 (Cambridge, 1958).

To say that moral weakness arises from ignorance plainly contradicted the observed facts, as far as Aristotle was concerned,[2] and St. Paul formulated the classic reply to Socrates' thesis (Rom. 7, 18–19): ". . . to will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good I find not. For the good that I would, I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do." Canto I of Dante's poem dramatizes this situation, and the successful journey is the resolution of the problem.

It is for this reason that a glance up to the light, symbolic of intellectual conversion in Plato's Republic and Timaeus, and thereafter a commonplace in vision and neoplatonic literature,[3] can only represent, in the beginning of Dante's poem, an incomplete turning. Conversion is not a matter of "either/or," for the pilgrim who has recovered himself where he catches sight of the mountain-top is one step closer to truth than he was throughout the dark night, but he is still far removed — three beasts removed — from his final goal. His fear is only *somewhat* allayed, "un poco queta," and the qualification is important. He has not yet climbed the mountain, the distant summit of which is his ultimate destination (as far as he can tell) and the desert slope, between the dark wood and the mountain proper, is an intermediate area, between the "selva oscura" and the objective. In the moral allegory, the existence of that middle ground contradicts the Socratic contention that virtue and knowledge are syn-

[2] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII, 2 (1145b,l.27).

[3] In the Republic (VII, 529c) Socrates says that the turning within of the soul is the beginning of looking upwards: "in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards. . ." (Jowett). See also the famous allegory of the cave, Rep. VII, 516a ff., and the "turning of the eye" in 519b, 533d and Timaeus 91d. According to Plotinus, death for the soul is to rest in matter. It must withdraw its eye from the mire and reascend (Enneads I, 8, 13; Bréhier I, 128). These are the ancient ancestors of the theme to which Dante alludes in the last sentence of a chapter in the Convivio (III,5): "O ineffabile sapienza che così ordinasti, quanto è povera la nostra mente a te comprendere! E voi a cui utilitade e diletto io scrivo, in quanta cechitade vivete, non levando li occhi suso a queste cose [the movements of the sun], tenendoli fissi nel fango de la vostra stoltezza!" For the influence of Plato's "turning of the eye" on the philosophical idea of conversion, see the succinct remarks of E. R. Dodds (ed.) in Proclos, The Elements of Theology (Oxford, 1933), p. 218. Coupled with this strictly philosophical tradition there exists also the religious topos, common to pagan and Christian thought. See Psalm 120, I: "levavi oculos meos in montes, unde veniet auxilium meum." In Conv. III, 12, 7, Dante tells us that "Nullo sensibile in tutto lo mondo e più degno di farsi essemplo di Dio che il sole." For the conversion toward the light in St. Thomas, see S.T. I–II, 109, 6 resp.

onymous, for the pilgrim's awakening suggests both a kind of conversion to truth, and an awareness of the great gap that remains to be traversed.

Dante ends the first stage of the pilgrim's temporary progress with a striking simile:

> E come quei che con lena affannata
> uscito fuor del pelago a la riva,
> si volge a l'acqua perigliosa e guata,
> così l'animo mio, ch'ancor fuggiva,
> si volse a rietro a rimirar lo passo
> che non lasciò già mai persona viva. (I, 22–27)

Part of the reason these lines are striking, aside from their poetic power, is that they seem gratuitous in terms of the poem's imagery thus far. They mark the end of the poem's first action, which has been presented as an extended simile of darkness and light, and to be presented with a simile within another startles the reader somewhat, when the literal terms are so disparate. To be sure, there is nothing unusual about representing a moral struggle with the figure of a drowning man. In Dante's day, references to St. Augustine's *fluctus concupiscentiae* [4] were frequent, and the comparison of life to a tempestuous sea was a commonplace. The interesting thing about Dante's metaphoric mariner, however, is that he neither drowns nor reaches his port, but rather emerges from the sea onto the shore of a middle ground, from which he looks back, terrified, at the danger which he has so narrowly escaped. Further on beyond this simile, the poet refers to the area between the dark wood and the mountain proper as

[4] ". . . pronus sum ad omne flagitium, ita me obruunt concupiscentiae fluctus, ut quotidie mergar, et in profundum peccatorum ruam." Augustine, Sermo CCCLXV, PL 39, 1645, quoted by Singleton, "Sulla fiumana ove 'l mar non ha vanto," Romanic Review XXXIX, 4 (December, 1948), p. 274. This article explores the long patristic tradition evoked by Dante's simile. For the philosophical meaning of the "shipwrecked soul" in antiquity, see the notes of J. H. Waszink (ed.) on Tertullian's De anima 52, 4 (Amsterdam, 1947, pp. 538–9). He quotes St. Ambrose's De bono mort. 8, 31: "denique iustis mors quietis est portus, nocentibus naufragium putatur" and suggests that such metaphoric shipwrecks may be dependent upon the helmsman-ship metaphor for the body and soul composite (Phaedrus 247c). In St. John Climacus' Scala Paradisi, translated by a contemporary of Dante's we find the word "pelago" used repeatedly in the same sense as in Inferno I: ". . . lo grave, profondo e lo crudele pelago della vita tempestosa. . . ." La Scala del Paradiso, ed. Antonio Ceruti (Bologna, 1874), p. 5.

a "piaggia diserta," and since the word "piaggia" may be translated either "slope" or "shore," the two images, the first a glance up to the light, and the second, an emergence from the water, exist side by side, and serve as two analogues for the same conversion, an abrupt movement from sin and ignorance into wisdom and virtue — or so it seems at any rate, until we learn what the pilgrim will soon discover: that this slope or shore is no exit, but rather a dead end for any man left on his own. The pilgrim's escape will be very temporary indeed, and his struggle to remain on the desert slope will fail, for a sudden movement from one extreme to another is characteristic of angels, and not of the fallen flesh.

Some of the ancients, presented with this image of a man rising up out of the water, might have mistaken the bank of that harsh sea for the shore of the plain of truth, and seen in the simile the pilgrim's victory. Cicero reported that the Stoics believed in conversions as sudden and extreme as this, wherein neither folly nor wisdom were susceptible of degree. He described their views in the third book of the De finibus,[5] and the description of the transition from folly to wisdom is represented there by a comparison somewhat like Dante's:

> Ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihilo magis respirare possunt si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo, nec catulus ille qui iam appropinquat ut videat plus cernit quam is qui modo est natus, item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille qui nihil processit.[6]

Cicero will not allow the Stoic contention to stand, however, and he dismisses this as one of those "extremely false analogies which the Stoics are so fond of employing." He supplies other analogies which seem to him more in keeping with the facts:

> Hebes acies est cuipiam oculorum, corpore alius languescit; hi curatione adhibita levantur in dies; valet alter plus cotidie, alter

[5] Dante quotes the De finibus at least nine times in his works. See E. Moore, Studies in Dante (first series): Scripture and Classical Authors in Dante (Oxford, 1896), pp. 353–4.

[6] Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum III, xiv, 48.

videt; his similes sunt omnes qui virtuti student; levantur vitiis, levantur erroribus.[7]

So it was for Dante, who could not believe in the conversion of "sink or swim," and who wrote the poem which is in a sense the dramatization of a gradual illumination. One has a feeling that the poet would have discussed these analogies in precisely the same way as did St. Augustine. In a letter to St. Jerome, Augustine wonders what the Apostle James means when he says (II,10): ". . . whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all." It reminds the Bishop of Hippo of the Stoic analogy:

Haec similitudo, ubi stultitia velut aqua, et sapientia velut aer ponitur, ut animus a praefocatione stultitiae tanquam emergens, in sapientiam repente respiret, non mihi videtur satis accommodata nostrarum Scripturarum auctoritati: sed illa potius, ut vitium vel stultitia tenebris, luci autem virtus vel sapientia comparetur, quantum ista similia de corporalibus ad intelligibilia duci possunt. Non itaque sicut de aquis in aerem surgens, ubi earum summum transierit, repente quantum sufficit inspiratur; sed sicut de tenebris in lucem procedens, paulatim progrediendo illuminatur. Quod donec plenissime fiat, jam eum tamen dicimus tanquam de abditissima spelunca egredientem, vicinia lucis afflatum, tanto magis, quanto magis propinquat egressui: ut illud quod in eo lucet, sit utique ex lumine quo progreditur; illud autem quod adhuc obscurum est, sit ex tenebris unde egreditur.[8]

Augustine could not be content with a simple wisdom-folly dichotomy, but neither did the Ciceronian analogy offered as an alternative satisfy his poetic imagination. From the barest suggestion of a visual analogue in Cicero's discussion, he evoked the Platonic myth of the cave — an ancestor of many allegorical journeys, and the ultimate source of Dante's journey through the infernal regions. Nowhere in Christian writing is the idea of the *itinerarium mentis* more clearly expressed, or its Platonic origin more clearly suggested.

We suspect, then, that no man leaves the dark wood as suddenly as Dante's water simile first suggests, and, as if to confirm

[7] Ibid., IV, xxiv, 65.
[8] Augustine, De sententia Jacobi liber, Epistola CLXVII, 13. PL 33, 738.

the suspicion, Dante refers to the dark wood as "the pass which no man ever left alive," [9] exactly as Augustine reminds us at the end of his discussion that in the sight of God shall no man living be justified. It is for this reason that the mind of the poet stops in its flight, like Lot's wife, to look back at the danger which it has only temporarily left behind. The pilgrim will soon learn of the tremendous gap that exists between knowledge in the abstract and wisdom in a concrete sense. He will learn that the body must be coaxed along to follow the movement of the mind, and that man must take the longer journey. Above all, he needs God's guidance, so that he may climb slowly and gradually from the cave, *a riveder le stelle*.[10]

The pilgrim's metaphoric shore or slope is far indeed from the Platonic plain of truth. It is the locus, in the moral landscape, of the Pauline situation, knowledge without virtue, where the spirit is willing but the flesh is fatally weak. We are reminded very effectively of the weakened flesh by the line immediately following our simile, the signal introducing this middle area:

> Poi ch'èi posato un poco il corpo lasso,
> Ripresi via per la piaggia diserta,
> Sì che 'l piè fermo sempre era 'l più basso. (I, 28–30)

This sudden incarnation, the presence of a body on this journey of the mind, marks Dante's poetic originality, and is the first intimation of an allegorical language different from that found in the innumerable dream-visions of the Middle Ages.[11] Further,

[9] This translation is based upon the interpretation suggested by A. Pagliaro, ". . . lo passo che non lasciò già mai persona viva" in Studi Letterari: Miscellanea in onore di Emilio Santini, Facoltà di lettere e filosofia dell' Università di Palermo (Palermo, 1956), p. 109: "È palese che *persona viva* costituisce una unità concettuale, poichè *viva* è attributo di *persona* e non ha il valore predicativo che l'interpretazione corrente vi attribuisce. Si tratterà perciò di 'persona viva' nel senso più proprio di uomo che sia in vita, anima e corpo." The quotation from the Psalms would seem to substantiate this reading, particularly since in the moral allegory, the summit of the mountain represents man's *justification*.

[10] In the Convivio (III, 7, 5) Dante used water to symbolize corporeity. The angels are free of it altogether, the animals are totally submerged, while man holds the *medius locus*: "da una parte sia da materia libera, da un' altra è impedita, sì come l'uomo ch'è tutto ne l'acqua fuor del capo, del quale non si può dire che tutto sia ne l'acqua nè tutto fuor da quella. . . ." Here the opposition body/soul is presented by the dyadic image of the Stoics. Man's mediate position in the ontological order corresponds to his position in the moral order — at least in this life.

[11] See Charles S. Singleton, Commedia: Elements of Structure, pp. 11–12.

it is a significant reminder of the fact that we are moving with the poet *in this life*, and that any contemplative venture will be hampered by a body which does not respond unhesitatingly to the prodding of a mind bent on the absolute. The pilgrim crosses (or attempts to cross) this middle area in a specific way: "so that the firm foot was always the lower," and the enormous amount of bibliography on that puzzling verse is testimony of the fact that this is no ordinary ambulation.[12] Rather does it tell us something important about the condition of man left to himself, and it therefore cannot be dismissed as simply one more insoluble riddle.

In the first place, it is clear that the pilgrim is making some forward and upward progress on this desert slope. This eliminates the suggestion that the "piè fermo," the "firm foot," might mean the foot upon which most of the body's weight is resting, for if this foot were *always* the lower, the pilgrim could make no progress at all, as a little experimentation will show. Yet, this is the interpretation which most Dantists have favored, from Boccaccio to the present.[13] A small number have suggested that the "piaggia" is not a slope, but rather a plain, and that when one walks normally on level ground, one's firm foot is always the lower, if only by a fraction of an inch, since it is firm only when it is completely flat. This interpretation makes the line appear totally superfluous, as if Dante were saying, I took up my way again, in such manner that I was walking — a tautology if not an absurdity. Finally, aware of all these difficulties, a few Dantists have suggested that "fermo" means the strong, and therefore by extension the right, foot, as one might call the right hand the "strong hand." The pilgrim could then be imagined as climbing a steep slope in a circular path, turning to the right (as he

[12] For a long history of the question before 1904, see Francesco D'Ovidio, Nuovi Studi Danteschi (Milano, 1907), pp. 447–69. See also Guerri, Di alcuni versi dotti della Divina Commedia (Città di Castello, 1908), pp. 51 ff., and G. Mazzoni, Lectura Dantis (Roma, 1914), pp. 23 ff., as well as many others. I have used D'Ovidio's study, pp. 452 ff., to summarize the various theories outlined in the following paragraph.

[13] Natalino Sapegno, commenting upon this verse, settles for this "obvious" reading: "Di questo verso, tanto discusso, la spiegazione più ovvia resta tuttavia quella che ne dava il Boccaccio: 'Mostra l'usato costume di coloro che salgono, che sempre si ferman più in su quel piè che più basso rimane.'" La Divina Commedia, ed. Sapegno (Firenze, 1955), I, 5.

will later climb the Mount of Purgatory) with his right foot always the lower because of the incline. Francesco D'Ovidio objected to this view for he found no proof that "fermo" was used in this way in Dante's time, and the text said nothing of a circular path. Both these arguments are cogent, and this reading too must be rejected.

The identification of the "piè fermo" as a specific foot, rather than as the foot upon which the climber always leans, would do far less violence to the literal image. Unfortunately, however, one cannot use twentieth century logic on a fourteenth century poem, and assume that "fermo" means right without having some texts to support such an assumption. Hundreds of years of Dante scholarship have failed to come up with any such texts, and D'Ovidio was therefore correct in his rejection of this reading, although he too surrendered before the enigmatic verse.

The word "fermo" had a meaning, however, in the scientific tradition, when applied to the feet. If we look into the theory of motion current in Dante's day, so important for the understanding of his poetical cosmos, we are in for some surprises, for we find there that the quality of firmness or fixity is a characteristic of the left, and not of the right part of the body. According to Aristotle, all motion originates from the right. Indeed, right is defined as the place whence motion begins, as far as the cosmos is concerned.[14] This principle was so widely held in the early centuries of Christianity that it was evoked even in mystical contexts, to gloss passages from the Bible. Marius Victorinus, for instance, explained that this was the reason that Christ sat at the right hand of God, for the Son of God is movement in action, and action pertains to the right.[15]

Aristotle also maintained that all movement consists of pushing and pulling, and that in movement, some point must remain stationary, to provide thrust.[16] In the local movement of animals,

[14] De caelo II, ii, 285a.

[15] Glossing Ephesians 1, 20 ("Et constituens illum in dextera sua coelis"), he explains: "Quoniam Christus Dei motus est; motus autem in operatione est; operatio vero motus semper in dextera est; id circo Christus in dextera Dei est constitutus." PL 8, 1250–1.

[16] De anima III, x, 433b24. Averroes' commentary assumes that it is the right which moves out first: "Quoniam autem motus animalis compositus est ex attractione et expulsione manifestum est, quoniam, quando pars dextra movetur a nobis

this alternate pushing and pulling is accomplished by the feet,[17] but the philosopher was subtle enough to see that the stationary foot was not invariably the left; some animals put the right foot out first, whereas others are capable of using either,[18] but most of Aristotle's followers were not so careful. Pliny, for instance, states unequivocally that "Omnia animalia a dextris partibus incedunt, sinistris incubant." [19] In antiquity, then, right came to mean agile, *dextrous*, and not firm or strong.

It was not until the reawakening of interest in Aristotle in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that these ideas became fixed in scientific speculation, at least as far as the Latin West was concerned. Albertus Magnus, one of the most authoritative of Scholastic Aristotelians, dedicates two of his Quaestiones super de animalibus to the problem of deciding which is the "firm" and which the "agile" foot. The first inquires "utrum pes dexter sit absolutior et habilior ad motum quam sinister," and he answers that this is indeed the case, except for some men who happen to be ambidextrous. In all other cases, "pes sinister minus aptus est ad motum quam dexter." This is because the heart, which is situated on the left side, nevertheless pours out its influence (*spiritus*) to the right.[20] The second question asks whether all animals naturally put their right feet forward first, and this time no exception is made to the affirmative answer: "Quod omne animal recte dispositum secundum interiora naturaliter habet praeponere pedem dextrum . . . *pes autem sinister stabilior et*

et sustentati fuerimus super sinistram, tunc quedam partes illius partis erunt expulse ad anterius et quedam attracte, et sunt partes que sunt posterius." Comment. Magnum in Arist. De anima lib., ed. F. Stuart Crawford, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi VI, 1 (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 525–6.

[17] De motu animalium 8, 702a21. St. Augustine alludes to this analysis in his De Genesi ad litteram (VIII, xxi, 41): "Denique nec in ambulando pes levatur, nisi alius fixus totum corpus ferat, donec ille qui motus est a loco unde fertur, ad locum quo fertur, immoto articulo sui cardinis innitatur." PL 34, 388–9.

[18] De hist. animal. II, ii, 498b.

[19] Naturalis Historiae XI, 45. Similarly Joannes Philoponus recalled the principle that all motion begins on the right, when he commented upon De anima I, 3, 406b25: *διὸ καὶ τὰ βάρη ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀριστεροὺς ἐπιτίθεμεν ὤμους, ἵνα εὔλυτα ᾖ τὰ δεξιὰ τὰ ἡγούμενα τῆς κινήσεως.* In Arist. de anima lib. comment., ed. M. Hayduck, Comment. in Arist. Graeca, vol. XV (Berlin, 1897), p. 119, ll. 30–31. Aristotle says nothing about left or right in this context, however, speaking merely in a general way of the movement imparted to the body by the soul.

[20] Quaestiones super de animalibus II, 3, ed. E. Filthaut, O.P. Opera Omnia XII (Monasterii Westfalorum, 1955), p. 110.

firmior est . . . et ideo corpus sibi magis innititur." One of the objections which Albert raises against his own thesis is that in fighting, one observes men putting out their left foot and leaning upon the right. He proves himself a shifty tactician as well as a philosopher by his response:

> Unde ad primam rationem dicendum, quod homo in defendendo se indiget pede sustineri et ictus declinari et ideo quandoque praeponit sinistrum pedem, ut pes dexter habilior sit ad motum. Unde non tantum imprimit pedem dextrum terrae sicut et sinistrum.[21]

Finally, and perhaps most influentially for Dante, Thomas Aquinas was just as explicit in his commentary on the De caelo. He specified the use of the word "fortior" when applied to the feet:

> Manus enim dextra est fortior quam sinistra, licet sit ejusdem figurae: et similiter humerus dexter est fortior quam sinister ad motum, quamvis sinister sit fortior ad portandum onus, et similiter pes dexter est fortior ad motum, sed pes sinister ad fixionem.[22]

Elsewhere in the commentary, he set forth the principle in its broadest terms: "Motus autem qui est secundum locum incipit a dextris. naturaliter enim animalia prius movent dextram partem quam sinistram, sicut in ambulando prius movent dextrum pedem." [23]

As far as the scholastics were concerned then, the first step of archetypal movement was taken by the right foot, and the left was considered the "pes firmior." It may well be that Dante was using this technical term when he wrote of the pilgrim's "piè fermo." A scholastic with a command of Aristotle inferior to Dante's would not have failed to read this expression as a reference to the left, or "fixed" foot.

It seems strange that Dante would use the medieval equivalent of clinical terminology to refer to one of the pilgrim's feet, when it would have been clearer and less indelicate to say simply, "the

[21] Ibid., II, 7; pp. 112–3. He adds this remark, which will prove to be of relevance for the allegory of Dante's verse: "Pes enim sinister magis stabilis est, et ideo illi magis est innitendum, propter quod *tardius movetur* nisi a casu." (Ibid.)

[22] De caelo et mundo II, lectio II (Arist. 285a15–25). Opera Omnia XIX, p. 82.

[23] Ibid., p. 81.

left foot." Knowing Dante as we do, however, we can be sure that the poet had his reason and that this is no vain display of an entirely irrelevant scientific erudition. We must wait until we know more about the passage and the tradition before we discuss the reason at any length, but for the moment we should notice that this is not the first instance of such language in the prologue scene. After the pilgrim has beheld the rays of the sun on the mountain top, he says that the fear which had lasted in the "lake of the heart" was somewhat allayed (l.19).[24] It has been generally agreed since Boccaccio's time that this *lago del cor* to which Dante refers, and which we shall later discuss, was the cavity of the heart in which dwelt the vital spirits. In the Vita Nuova, Dante refers to this cavity as a secret room of the heart in which the vital spirits were set trembling by his meeting with Beatrice. These vital spirits are the Aristotelian *pneuma* and the *lago del cor* would therefore appear to be as physiological an expression as the phrase we have been discussing, the *piè fermo*, for which it so clearly sets the stage. We must now investigate the meaning of these curious verses.

If the pilgrim advances up the slope with his left foot always lower than his right, then it is clear that he is not advancing normally. We cannot account for this solely by imagining an exceedingly steep incline, for one can move the feet consecutively, even when scaling a cliff. Rather must we look to the state of the pilgrim to explain this queer situation. He has barely escaped with his life from the dangerous "passo" and has rested his body only "un poco." He is at the point of total exhaustion, and although he manages to make some advance, it seems that his motion is unlike the pace of a strong pilgrim. He is dragging himself up, with his right foot leading, and his left lagging behind. In a sense he limps toward the summit, as a man wounded in the

[24] Inf. I, 19–21: "Allor fu la paura un poco queta/che nel lago del cor m'era durata/la notte ch'i'passai con tanta pieta." In the Vita nuova (II, 4), Dante refers to this cavity of the heart as the "secretissima camera del cuore," in which dwells "lo spirito della vita." Boccaccio's commentary on the line adds that in this receptacle "abitano li spiriti vitali." According to Aristotle, it was in the heart that the *pneuma* was gathered (De motu 8, 702a21) and, as we shall see, this *spiritus* applied alternate pushing and pulling forces to the muscles and tendons, enabling the body to move. For Albertus Magnus, the left foot was less agile because the heart "influit suam virtutem in partem dextram" (loc. cit.). The two expressions "lago del cor" and "piè fermo" both obviously allude to the Aristotelian physiology.

left leg. There is no literal justification for this incapacity of the pilgrim, just as there is no literal reason for his body being so tired, or later, for his being able to bypass the leopardess and the lion, but not the wolf. But it may be suggested that just as exhaustion is the result of the mortal combat in the waters of the heart, so this weakness arises from a wound suffered by a limb of the soul.[25]

The poem is an itinerary, a "cammino," along the road of this life, made by a soul, and we have to do with a very important element of the first canto, where there is no superfluous detail, precisely because the allegory dictates the letter. Just as the body moves with its feet, so the "body" of the soul, so to speak, moves with twin powers, and to say that the two are not working in harmony as in normal movement is to say something very important about this first attempted journey, in an allegorical language which has a long tradition.[26]

[25] E. R. Curtius (European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. W. R. Trask [New York, 1953], pp. 136 ff.) discusses corporal metaphors and remarks that the subject is relatively unexplored: "An entire volume could be filled with examples from patristic literature, alone." He suggests that the source of such imagery is Plato's "eye of the soul," and collects some of the more "baroque" examples ("ears of the mind," "knees of the heart," "the hand of my tongue"), but does not mention the *pes animae* which we are about to discuss.

[26] D'Ovidio (op. cit., p. 461) doubted the existence of an allegorical significance in this verse, and seemed not at all disturbed by the fact that the commentators (except Boccaccio) were quick to find one. Had he known of the many "feet-of-the-soul" images in the patristic tradition, however, one feels that his skepticism would have been somewhat shaken. Furthermore, as soon as one grants that "fermo" means "left," there can be no doubt that the line is charged with allegorical meaning, for the distinction between right and left is very carefully made by Dante throughout his itinerary, as it was in nearly all vision literature, from the Pistis Sophia and the Acts of Thomas to the philosophical vision poems of Avicenna and its derivatives. By far the most famous of such distinctions derives from the use made of the Pythagorean "Y," or *bivium* to represent at once the topography of the other world, and the crossroads of choice in this life. Servius' commentary on Aeneid VI, 136 is one of the most famous allegorizations of the left/right distinction in these terms (ed. Thilo [Leipzig, 1888], pp. 30–31), and the Visio Tnugdali admirably illustrates the use made of the ancient idea in medieval voyages to the other world: "Respondens angelus dixit ei: Benedicta sis, ne mireris; hec est mutatio dextere excelsi. Per aliam viam debemus redire in regionem nostram. Tu ergo benedic deum et sequere me" (ed. Wagner [Erlangen, 1882], p. 40). In the strictly philosophical allegory which E. Cerulli has suggested is one of the few antecedents of Dante's poem ("Les Pérégrinations de l'âme dans l'autre monde d'après un anonyme de la fin du XIIe siècle," ed. M. T. d'Alverny, Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du M.A., XIII [1940–42], pp. 283–4; E. Cerulli, Il "Libro della Scala," Studi e testi 150 [Città del Vaticano, 1949], pp. 519–22), we find that heaven and hell represent the *dispositiones animae:*

Plato in the Phaedrus constructed the justly famous myth of the soul — the chariot drawn by two winged horses, which perpetually pull against each other, the black steed on the left veering off the course pursued by the white.[27] In the Timaeus, in a different context, we are told that the soul becomes incarnate as man, and if this rational being is given education, "inmunis omni perturbatione atque aegritudine ducet aeuum." If he neglects it, however, he limps along the road of this life: "si negleget, claudum iter vitae serpens cum familiari domum stultitia revocabitur ad inferna."[28] The commentary of Chalcidius on this passage associated the image of the feet with the allegory obvious in the Phaedrus myth, and thus bequeathed to the Middle Ages a dyadic division of the human composite represented by the figure of the walking man:

> Namque conponit hominem ex anima et corpore. Quotus quisque igitur utrumque curabit, erit incolumis et fortis. Qui neutrum, mancus et debilis. Qui alterum ex duobus, claudus. Ergo indocilis et corpori tantum diligentiam inpertiens claudam habebit vitam procul dubio. Claudam quoque etiam illius animam fore, cuius rectae quidem sint opiniones, sed [qui] nequequam sacris intelligibilium arcanorum sit initiatus.[29]

For Christians who had undergone the influence of the neoplatonists, the association of the feet of the body with wings of the soul was a commonplace.[30] Clement of Alexandria contrasted the feet of the body with the winged soul in prayer.[31] St. Ambrose, whose exegesis is full of Platonic imagery, added the image of the

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dextra et sinistra et media. ". . . dicitur dispositio dextra felicitas et sinistra miseria." Here the left and right of the cosmos are associated with the "left and right" of the soul. In the light of all these currents it seems rash in the extreme to dismiss the possibility of allegory in Dante's verse. For the importance of direction or "orientation" in gnostic literature and in Avicenna's poetry, see H. Corbin, "Avicenne et le récit visionnaire," Conferenze dell'Ist. Ital. per il medio ed estremo oriente VII (Roma, 1955), pp. 16–17. For the "Y" in the pagan otherworld, see Franz Cumont, Lux Perpetua (Paris, 1949), p. 287, and for the entire history of the idea, see E. Panofsky, Herkules am Scheidenwege, Stud. der Bibl. Warburg (Leipzig, 1930), esp. pp. 62 ff.

[27] Phaedrus 253c.

[28] Timaeus 44c, trans. Chalcidius, ed. Wrobel (Leipzig, 1876), p. 50.

[29] Ibid., Commentarius IX, 211; p. 250.

[30] See, for example, St. Cyprian, Epistola LXXVII — Ad Nemesianum; PL 4, 429.

[31] Stromatum VII, 7; PG 9, 456.

feet to the traditional analogues of human movement found in ancient psychology. Speaking of the flight to the heavenly Jerusalem, he discusses the means whereby such a journey is accomplished:

> Sed quae est fuga? Non utique pedum, qui sunt corporis. Isti enim quocunque currunt, in terra currunt, et de solo ad solum transeunt. Nec navibus fugiamus, aut curribus, aut equis qui obligantur et cadunt: sed *fugiamus animo*, et oculis, aut *pedibus interioribus*. Assuescamus oculos nostros videre quae dilucida et clara sunt, spectare vultum continentiae et temperantiae.[32]

The images which are here representative of physical or bodily movement are Platonic commonplaces to be found catalogued in compilations concerning the soul such as that of Iamblichus.[33] As such they are rejected by Ambrose, for this is a flight of the soul, exactly as is undertaken by Dante's "animo . . . ch'ancor fuggiva," and for such a flight, the inward feet are required.

As so often, here too it was St. Augustine who established the theme for Biblical exegetes throughout the Middle Ages. Speaking of the journey to God, a favorite Augustinian theme, he says:

> verum tamen in quod pervenimus, in eo ambulemus. ambulatio ista non corporibus pedibus, sed mentis affectibus et vitae moribus geritur, ut possint esse perfecti iustitiae possessores, qui recto itinere fidei de die in diem sua renovatione proficientes iam perfecti facti sunt eiusdem iustitiae viatores.[34]

This journey to Justice, an ancestor of Dante's moral allegory, was a metaphor which Augustine worked out in detail. Elsewhere he tells us that the feet in such a journey are our affections: "pedes enim nostri in hoc itinere, affectus nostri sunt." [35] Insofar as we have love, in that measure do we approach God or move away from Him. He applied to the feet of the soul his famous

[32] Liber de Isaac et anima VIII, 79; PL 14, 559.

[33] Jamblique, Traité de l'âme, trans. A. Festugière, O.P., in La Révélation d'Hèrmes Trismégiste, III, 226–27. For the sources of such metaphors, and for their philosophical importance, see Festugière's lengthy notes, ibid.

[34] De peccatorum meritis et remissione II, 13, 20. Corpus Script. Eccles. Latin. LX, 93.

[35] Ennaratio in Psalm. XCIV, 1; PL 37, 1217.

dichotomy: "pes animae recte intelligitur amor; qui cum pravus est, vocatur cupiditas aut libido; eum autem rectus, dilectio vel charitas." [36]

In the Bible one finds many instances of such anatomical imagery, and even in passages where the feet are mentioned with what would appear to be primarily literal reference, we can of course be quite sure that the exegetes found meanings much like those suggested by Ambrose and Augustine before them, and these were echoed with, alas, little variation throughout the Middle Ages. Two passages in particular called for special treatment, however, and it would be well to take note of them here, with the interpretations given to them by the pseudo-Ambrose, Augustine and Gregory the Great, who were to establish the exegetical tradition.

For St. Ambrose, original sin was the bite of the serpent, and he tells us that if we wish to avoid a repetition of the fall in our own lives, we must get our spiritual feet off the ground, "ut serpens calcaneum nostrum quod vulneret, in terrenis reperire non possit." [37] Elements from Genesis and from Plato's flight of the soul are here fused together, under the influence of Philo Judaeus.[38] In the De sacramentis, attributed for many years to Ambrose, the wounding of the foot is associated with the residual effect of original sin *after* baptism. Why is it, the author wonders, that Christ, while about to wash the feet of Peter (John XIII, 8–10), says: "Qui lavit, non necesse habet iterum lavare, nisi ut solos pedes lavet."? The answer, he replies, is that Adam trod upon the serpent, and that because of this all of us must "wash away the venom." This, according to the author, is the symbolic origin of

[36] Ibid., IX, 15; PL 36, 124.

[37] De fuga saeculi VII, 43; PL 14, 618.

[38] Philo, glossing Gen. 49, 16 ("Dan shall be a serpent by the way . . . that biteth the horse's heels. . . ."), suggested that the soul is our road and that "the passions are likened to a horse: "For passion, like a horse, is . . . impulsive, full of wilfulness, and naturally restive." (Legum allegoria II, 96; Philo I, trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker, Loeb Classical Library [London, 1929], p. 287.) This is obviously Plato's horse on the left. In Ambrose's day, it was thought that Gen. 3, 15 ("he shall watch thy head, and thou shalt watch his heel") meant that the serpent wounded Adam's heel, and Philo notes the difficulty involved in the meaning of that verse (ibid., p. 429). It may be that Ambrose blended the two passages from Genesis, and associated them with the Phaedrus myth.

the washing-of-the-feet ceremony in the northern Italian Church.[39]

St. Augustine explained the ceremony of the washing of the feet in the same way, with a different, and certainly more striking image, thoroughly consistent with the journey motif. Man is indeed cleansed by baptism. Why then is the washing of the feet required? Because even the man walking to God gets the dust of this life upon his feet.[40]

Elsewhere in the writings of the Bishop of Hippo, this partial uncleanness is expressed with the image of the limping man, who must be cured by the physician of the soul.[41] Sometimes Christ suggests remedies for lameness which are rather extreme, to our way of thinking. So it seems, at any rate, when we are presented with Augustine's gloss on Jacob's limp, for there he recalls Matt. XVIII, 8, and its drastic cure: "If thy leg offend thee, cut it off . . . for it is more expedient to you to enter the kingdom of God with one foot, than to enter into eternal fire with two." [42]

Finally, Gregory the Great added even more permutations to the bizarre catalogue of feet-of-the-soul images. Commenting on Jacob's wrestling with the angel, he identifies the feet as love of God and love of the world. After contact with the absolute, Jacob limps, for his love for the world decays, just as the soul which holds on to the angel "in solo pede amoris Dei tota virtute se sustinet. Et in ipso stat, quia pedem amoris saeculi quem ponere in terra consueverat, jam a terra suspensum portat." [43]

These passages in the Bible, Christ's washing of the disciples'

[39] De sacramentis III, i, 4–7; PL 16, 452–3. For the ceremony of the washing of the feet, and the controversy it provoked, see A. Malvy, "Lavement des pieds" (art.), Dictionnaire de théologie catholique v. 9 (Paris, 1926), cols. 16–36.

[40] ". . . verum tamen cum in rebus humanis postea vivitur, utique terra calcatur. Ipsi igitur humani affectus, sine quibus in hac mortalitate non vivitur, quasi pedes sunt, ubi ex humanis rebus afficimur; et sic afficimur, ut si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos decipiamus." In Joan. Evang. XIII, 6–10, Tract. LVI, 4; PL 35, 1788–89.

[41] "respondemus peccatum quidem actum dici et esse, non rem. Sed etiam in corpore claudicatio eadem ratione actus est, non res, quoniam res pes ipse vel corpus vel homo est, qui pede vitato claudicat nec tamen vitare potest claudicationem, nisi habuerit sanatum pedem, quod etiam in interiore homine fieri potest, sed gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum." De perfectione iustitiae hominis III, 5; CSEL 42 (Leipzig, 1902), p. 5.

[42] Sermo V, 8; PL 38, 58.

[43] Homiliarum in Ezechielem, lib. II, hom. II, 13; PL 76, 955–56.

feet and Jacob's limping after his encounter with the angel, as well as many more passages involving the same elements, were glossed with echoes of the commentaries of these three fathers for hundreds of years, and there is therefore little to be gained by citing all the exegetes on the subject.[44] One may say simply that until the scholastics, commentators seemed content to apply to various Biblical verses these rather general identifications and interpretations. Elements from each of them are obviously suggestive for the reading of Dante's line and it comes as no surprise that many commentators, including Pietro di Dante, the poet's son, Benvenuto da Imola, and Francesco da Buti, glossed Dante's "piè fermo" with elements from these commentaries.[45] None of the interpretations, however, provide more than generic explications of a verse which we suspect, because of its context, is more philosophically precise. The "piè fermo" verse calls attention to a particular foot (as do none of the Church Fathers when they speak of the feet of the soul) and it does so in scientific language. It is to the philosophy, rather than to the exegesis of the Middle Ages that we must turn in order to arrive at the fullness of Dante's meaning.

In the early thirteenth century, a new identification of the feet of the soul gradually displaced the traditional ones. According to

[44] A few representative citations will suffice: Rabanus Maurus, De universo IV, 1; PL 111, 75; Comment. in Genesim III, 20 (where Gregory is quoted at length); PL 107, 610; Rupert Tuitiensis, In Exodum comment. II, 13 (De Trinitate); PL 167, 620; Hugh of St. Victor, Miscellanea III, 126; PL 697–8 (where Gregory is again quoted); all of Gregory's citations are quite naturally recalled by Garnerius of St. Victor, Gregorianum in his chapter LVI: "De pedibus"; PL 193, 233 ff.; finally Alanus ab Insulis faithfully recalls Augustine: "*Lavi pedes meos*, id est affectus meos purgavi ab omni saeculari cura et concupiscentia. . . ." Elucidatio in Cant. canticorum V; PL 210, 86.

[45] Pietro quoted Augustine Ennar. in Psalm. IX, 15. He then concluded that the pilgrim was limping: "Igitur . . . pes auctoris, idest affectio in quo magis adhuc firmabatur, erat inferior, quod adhuc ad infimi terrena relicta aliquantulum magis inclinabatur, quamquam superior pes ad superiora ascenderet, et sicut claudus ibat." Benvenuto da Imola offered similar identifications for the pilgrim's feet: "pes inferior erat amor, qui trahebat ipsum ad inferiora terrena, qui erat firmior et fortior adhuc in eo quam pes superior, idest amor, qui tendebat ad superna. Amor enim est pes, quo anima graditur. . . ." Francesco da Buti followed the others: "come l'uomo ha due piedi, così due affetti erano in lui, l'uno ragionevole alle virtù, l'altro sensuale alle concupiscenzie." For all these comments, see G. Biagi (ed.) La D. C. nella figurazione artistica e nel secolare commento (Torino, 1924), vol. I (Inferno), canto I, 30.

Albertus Magnus,[46] Godfrey Admontensis,[47] and Hugo de Sancto Caro,[48] the body proceeded by means of its limbs, just as the soul proceeded by twin powers: *intellectus* and *affectus*, or the apprehensive and the appetitive faculties. The interior acts of the soul had long been known as the "steps" of the soul.[49] Now for the first time, the traditional image became subjected to the same close scrutiny as was the psychology of human action. This was the age during which the study of Aristotle was at its peak, and it is to him that we must return, where we began this part of our discussion.

According to Aristotle in the third book of the De anima, all movement involves three factors: 1) that which originates movement, 2) the means whereby it originates it, and 3) the thing which is moved. Analyzing the origin of movement we find that the first of these three factors can be subdivided, for that which originates movement can be understood either a) as the object or external good which moves without itself being moved, or b) as the faculty of appetite, which is at once moved (since it is acted upon by the mind's apprehension of the object) and moving (since it moves the body). The second factor, the instrument of movement, is to be found where the beginning and end of motion coincide: the heart, which is the center of articulation, like the joint of an extremity, the end of one organ, the beginning of another.[50] It is the mid-point between the alternate movements of pushing and pulling in the motion of an animal, one side remaining fixed while the other moves, itself in turn becoming fixed while the former moves.[51] The third factor, the thing moved, is of course the body. Recapitulating the whole process of movement, we find

[46] "Duos pedes habet anima, intellectum scilicet et affectum. Qui quando aequales sunt, quod scilicet affectus adaequatur intellectui veritatis, homo bene ambulat. Si autem vel ambo vel alter curvus est, intellectus scilicet per errorem et affectus per libidinem, homo claudus est." Postilla super Isaiam, XXV, 6, ed. F. Siepmann, Opera Omnia XIX (Monasterii Westfalorum, 1952), p. 371.

[47] "Sed quid per pedes? Intellectus utique et affectus. . . ." Homiliae Dominicales Aestivales LXXXVI; PL 174, 601.

[48] See below, p. 268.

[49] See, for example, Gregory the Great's gloss on Ezekiel 1, 7: "Et pedes eorum pedes recti": "Quid per pedes nisi gressus actuum designatur?" Hom. in Ezech. lib. I, hom. III; PL 76, 806.

[50] De anima III, x, 433b ff.

[51] De motu animalium 8, 702a ff.

that the object or thing-to-be-done is apprehended by the mind. The mind's last movement is the first movement of the appetite, or the moment of choice, the "actus intellectus appetitivi, vel appetitus intellectivi." After choice, the faculty of appetite, working on the "spirit" (*πνεῦμα*) located in the heart, the mysterious substance which is the locus of contact between body and soul, causes the spirit to flow through the arteries, thereby moving the muscles and tendons with alternate pushing and pulling movements, and the human mechanism moves out step by step. It has by this time become apparent that Aristotle's *pneuma*, the *spiritus* of the scholastics, is precisely the vapor to which Dante refers in the beginning of the Vita Nuova as the "spirito di vita," which resides in what the poet has here called the "lago del cor."

From this rather primitive summary, it is clear that the movement of the soul is exactly analogous to the movement of the body, for just as the heart is at once the end of one movement and the beginning of another, so the act of choice, residing in the soul, is the end of one movement (that of the mind), and the beginning of another (the appetite).[52] The archetypal circle of movement thus applies to both body and soul, as indeed it does to the entire Aristotelian cosmos.[53] In order to make the two analogous planes of action, of body and soul, completely congruent, one had only to associate the beginning principle of cosmic or corporeal movement, the right, with the beginning of choice, the apprehension, or the reason.[53a] Nothing suggests itself as more natural to St. Bonaventure, for instance, to whom we may now turn for a statement of the analogy between the acts of the soul and the steps of the

[52] See Landino's exact remark, in his commentary on the verse: ". . . come il corpo è portato da' piedi, così l'anima dall'appetito" (Biagi, loc. cit.).

[53] See Convivio III, II, 5: ". . . quello che è causato da corpo circulare ne ha in alcuno modo circulare essere. . . ." Busnelli and Vandelli mention Albertus Magnus' use of this principle in the De causis (1, 4, 7), "applicandolo al moto e alla struttura degli animali, che si muovono per semicircoli, e hanno le articolazioni organate con dischi e cavità, perchè tutto è causato dal moto circolare dei cieli." Convivio, ed. Busnelli-Vandelli (Firenze, 1934), p. 266. We may add that Aristotle compares the heart's *motus girativus* to a "ball and socket joint" (trans. W. D. Ross, Works of Arist. III [Oxford, 1931], 433b21) in De anima III, x. Undoubtedly Albert had this type of articulation in mind.

[53a] Such an association is implicit in Timaeus 36c ff. where the "circle of the same" in the world soul (i.e., the celestial equator) and in the human soul (i.e., the reflective intellect) is given a motion *ἐπὶ δεξιά*. A discussion of the relevance of this analogy to Dante's poem is in preparation.

body. He analyzes the "syllogism of sin" as consisting of four short steps:

> actus autem interiores sunt semitae breves, ad mortem breviter perducentes, quoniam quatuor solum passus continent, quibus pedes animae ad mortem currunt, vel currere solent. Unus pes animae est motus apprehensivus, alter motus appetitivus; apprehensivus dexter, appetitivus sinister; quoniam pes dexter movetur prius, sinister posterius, et secundum philosophum "apprehensio praecedit appetitum." Primus itaque passus pedis dextri est peccati cognitio; secundus, scilicet pedis sinistri, delectatio; tertius, pedis dextri, deliberatio; quartus, pedis sinistri, electio. . . .[54]

Thus, to represent the intimate correspondence existing between the soul's twin powers, the scholastics chose the analogy of walking, and in doing so were elaborating a tradition as old as Plato, particularly apt in an age which considered every man a traveler.

For Dante, imbued with the study of Aristotle, the analogy was an analogy in a very strict sense, and not a mere comparison. The figure of a man in the act of walking was quite literally the incarnation of the act of choice, for walking was simply choosing brought down to the material plain. The vital spirit residing in the heart has for its entire function the transmission of the soul's commands, and the concatenation of thoughts and desires produced by the intellect and the will is reproduced, in the act of walking, by the succession of right and left. What better way to represent a struggle which goes on in the soul, than to observe the effects of that very struggle upon a body.

It is a tired body, at that, and it is time that we paid more attention to it. In line 15 Dante tells us that the pilgrim's heart was pierced with fear by the dark wood. Fear is a passion, and as such, for medieval science, it had both its interior and exterior manifestations, being at once a psychic and a physical phenomenon. A man who is afraid suffers contractions of the vital spirit, which is to say that he is likely to tremble all over, make chattering noises with his teeth, and lose control of himself generally.[55] The

[54] Sermones: Dominica tertia in Quadragesima II; Opera Omnia (Quaracchi, 1901), IX, 225.

[55] Aristotle, Problemata XXVII, 10–11 (949a). Cf. Thomas, S.T. I–II, q. 44: De effectibus timoris.

reason for this is that the vital spirit rushes to the center of the body, and no longer exercises control over the members — as frightened citizens rush from the fields to the citadel, St. Thomas explained.[56] This is the phenomenon the pilgrim later experiences when he meets the wolf, for it makes his veins and arteries tremble.[57]

The sight of the sun, however, allays the fear which had collected in the lake of the pilgrim's heart, the point to which all vital spirits flow, but the poet draws our attention to the qualification "un poco," by repeating it in line 28, with its reference this time to the body. If the vital spirits are somewhat calmed, but not entirely, how does this affect the entire human composite? A quote from Thomas will help us to answer the question:

> Ex parte igitur instrumentorum corporalium, timor, quantum est de se, semper natus est impedire exteriorem operationem, propter defectum caloris qui ex timore accidit in exterioribus membris. Sed ex parte animae, si sit timor moderatus, non multum rationem perturbans; confert ad bene operandum . . . si vero timor tantum increscat quod rationem perturbet, impedit operationem etiam ex parte animae.[58]

The traveler's problem, then, is that his body will not respond perfectly to his mind, for his fear has been only somewhat allayed. If it were only a question of an interior action, one of the mind alone on the purely literal level, he would have no problem. This pilgrim, unfortunately, has a mountain to climb, difficult for anyone, let alone for a man half struck with fear, and therefore only half able to walk — limping in one leg.

After this long excursion, we are in a position to understand Dante's language in these verses more clearly. Literally speaking, a man is lost in a dark wood, and is therefore afraid. Having finally caught sight of the sun, he is somewhat comforted, but because he is not completely free of fear, and the vital spirits which had collected in the "lake of the heart" are only partially calmed, he is not in complete control of his body. His left leg,

[56] S.T. I–II, 44, 1, resp.

[57] Inf. I, 90: "ch'ella mi fa tremar le vene e i polsi." The veins and arteries serve to transmit the vital spirits.

[58] Loc. cit., art. 4, resp.

which even in a normal man does not receive as much of the vital spirit as does the right (it is for this reason the "firm," rather than the "agile," foot), now so lacks the *spiritus* of the heart that it is unable to respond to the command of the mind, and the pilgrim consequently limps toward his objective.

But this is the journey of an "animo . . . ch'ancor fuggiva" (l.25), and hence, when we read of the sudden intrusion of a body where there was no body before — the "corpo lasso" (l.28) — we are surely to understand this, to use the words of Charles Singleton, as the "vision made flesh." [59] Here begins the journey of the "body" of the soul, accomplished, as St. Ambrose suggested,[60] *pedibus interioribus*, and the feet are precisely the soul's two powers: *intellectus* and *affectus*. We have only to understand St. Bonaventure's four syllogistic steps as heading in an opposite direction — not the four short steps on the road toward perdition, but rather the innumerable, difficult steps leading to beatitude; difficult, if not impossible, until the defective left foot is made "libero, dritto e sano" [61] after another, far longer journey.

In the fifth canto of the Paradiso, the poet gives us an intimation of what the step is like after the longer journey. Beatrice tells the pilgrim that she burns with the supernatural love of charity. She explains: ". . . Ciò procede/ da perfetto veder, che, come apprende,/ così nel bene appreso move il piede." [62] We know here which foot it is that moves out toward the good, for the good is the object of the will, as the truth is the object of the reason. Perfect desire follows perfect intellection and such perfection can only be the product of sanctifying grace. If one or the other of the feet is lacking or defective, the journey cannot end in success, for we have it on the authority of St. Thomas that the mind must move to God *et per intellectum et per affectum*. Unfortunately for man in his fallen state, Thomas goes on to say,

[59] Commedia: Elements of Structure, p. 13.

[60] See above, p. 257.

[61] Purgatorio XXVII, 140.

[62] "S'io ti fiammeggio nel caldo d'amore/di là dal modo che 'n terra si vede,/sì che delli occhi tuoi vinco il valore,/ non ti maravigliar; chè ciò procede/ da perfetto veder, che, come apprende,/ così nel bene appreso move il piede." Paradiso V, 1–6. Dante implies the analogy between the movement of the soul and the movement of the feet in Purg. XVIII, 43–45: ". . . s'amore è di fuori a noi offerto,/ e l'anima non va con altro piede,/ se dritta o torta va non è suo merto."

". . . intellectus est fortior in cognoscendo quam affectus in diligendo; unde dicit Augustinus [In Psalm. CXVIII, serm. viii], 'Praecedit intellectus, *sequitur tardus aut nullus affectus*.' " [63] Ever since Adam's sin, man's ability to see the good has outdistanced his ability to do it on his own, for in the life without sanctifying grace, the middle ground of which St. Paul was so painfully aware, only one foot takes the forward step.

We have already seen that both Augustine and the author of the De sacramentis associated the washing of the feet with the removal of the residual effect of original sin, rather than with the removal of sin itself. In metaphor, the washing removed the "venom" or "dust" from post-lapsarian feet already made right by Baptism. Although the image was a different one in the 12th and 13th centuries, the doctrine remained the same. The wounds of the feet were the residual effect of the fall. The right foot, *intellectus*, suffered the wound of ignorance; the left, *affectus*, that of concupiscence.

To describe Adam's condition between his creation *in naturalibus* and the infusion of grace, the scholastics used the formula *Stare poterat, pedes movere non poterat*, which meant that the first man could prevent himself from falling away by the natural power of his will, but that he was powerless to advance any closer to God.[64] The author of the Summa theologica long attributed to Alexander of Hales had this formula in mind when he spoke of Adam's need of two supernatural perfections, with respect to both *intellectus* and *affectus*, so that he might please God and "in via morum recte ambulare." As his knowledge had to be perfect, so his faculty of desire had to be "rectus et expeditus in actibus . . . *ut non claudicaret*," so that he might not limp. By his sin, he lost this double perfection, and fell into ignorance and concupiscence:

[63] In IV Sent. d.xvii, q.1, a.3, sol. 3; quoted by Singleton, Journey, pp. 13–14.

[64] According to Henri de Lubac (Surnaturel [Paris, 1946], p. 96), the maxim is not found in Augustine, but represents his thought accurately. The *locus classicus* is Peter Lombard Sent. 2, 29, 1. We may add to the instances of the use of the formula given by de Lubac, the Sententiae divinitatis II, II, 2 ed. B. Geyer, Beiträge zur Gesch. der Phil. des M. VII, 2–3 (1909), p. 24. One of the passages from Augustine which may have been influential in this formulation of the doctrine is Ennar. in Psalm. XCIV, 1: "Unus ergo idemque homo corpore stans uno loco, et amando Deum accedit ad Deum, et amando iniquitatem recedit a Deo: nusquam pedes movet, et tamen potest et accedere et recedere." (PL 37, 1217)

ignorantia boni et concupiscentia mali.[65] In the twelfth century, these two were almost universally regarded as hereditary results of the fall in Adam's children. Of the two, however, it was concupiscence, the wound of the left foot, which was so firmly linked to the doctrine of original sin as to be considered by many of the scholastics both the sin and its consequence.[66]

Concupiscence was variously defined, but one of the ways of describing it was to quote St. Paul's confession on the inefficacy of his will. An anonymous summist of the school of Hugh of St. Victor states:

> notandum quod ignorantia boni et concupiscentia mali que est effectus peccati primi hominis est omnibus non renatis originale peccatum. Sed sciendum quod concupiscentia mali dicitur difficultas, eo quod difficile sit concupiscentiam carnalis vinculi evitare. Unde Apostolus ait: non quod ego volo illud ago, sed quod nolo illud facio.[67]

Sometimes, on the other hand, St. Paul's words were called to mind by the figure of the limping man without reference to the specific wound. Hugo de Sancto Caro, the second and least famous of the Dominican triumvirate, perhaps alludes to Paul when glossing Proverbs 2,20: ". . . per viam veritatis, pede intellectus, et per viam bonitatis, pede affectus, idem habentes in affectu et intellectu, *non aliud scientes et aliud volentes*, ut multi." [68] At any rate, it seems clear that Dante's *homo claudus* would have suggested, to a contemporary reader as learned as the poet, one of Adam's children, afflicted by the disease contracted by his father, unable to order his appetites to his mind.[69]

[65] (Pseudo) Alexander of Hales, Summa Theologica, Prima Pars, secundi libri, Inq. IV, tr. III, quest. IV, 516 (Quaracchi, 1928), II, 762.

[66] For a résumé of the history of the doctrine, see Odon Lottin, Problèmes de Morale III, 1; Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles (Louvain, 1954), IV, 272–275.

[67] Manuscript Clm 7972 (Munich, Staatsbibliothek), f.6r; partially edited by Lottin, ibid., p. 71.

[68] Hugo de Sancto Caro, Liber Proverbiorum II; Opera Omnia (Lugduni, 1645), III, 6, col. 4.

[69] Perhaps the most convincing proof that the pattern we are suggesting, a progression from illness, to a partial health, to final soundess and Virgil's pronouncement "te sovra te corono e mitrio," was recognizable to a contemporary is provided by the anonymous text edited by M. T. d'Alverny (see above, note 26). We read there that the soul has three dispositions, right, left, and middle, just

In the prologue scene, we have to do with three separate areas, and if we wished to extend the image of the feet of the soul to these areas, we might say that in the first, the dark wood, neither of the feet is *rectus*, and there is only the aimless wandering of a man enmeshed in fear and sin: *homo collapsus*. Once the pilgrim beholds the rays of the sun, however, he has undergone an intellectual conversion, and is healed, so to speak, in one foot. This is the condition of *homo claudus*, divided by an inward struggle. If he were somehow to bypass the three beasts, he would then become healed in both limbs, and his will (*affectus*), free, straight and sound, could follow its own discernment (*intellectus*), which is accomplished in fact only at the summit, at the coronation of the pilgrim, when he is dismissed by his first guide to await the second.[70] If our reading is correct, then it follows that the three

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as the body has three states: health, illness and neutrality. Further, the dispositions of the right are ten, and lead to Paradise, as the ten on the left lead to hell. The first step toward happiness is union with the guidance of an angelic *intellectus agens*. The first step toward hell cannot fail to remind us of the Pauline struggle: "Prima est ut *non possit operari anima quod vult*, quia non habet obediens sibi nec cui imperet, nec proprias operationes secundum creationem exercere potest, et cum hoc cupiat et non possit, torquetur . . . . Et quia sic impeditur anima ab operibus suis et ab his que multum cupit, dicitur ligata et in manibus et in pedibus, sicut dicitur homo ligatus qui detinetur ab his que vult facere" (p. 294). The greatest difficulty is posed by deciding what is the condition of man who dies with the *dispositio media*, and the text suggests a vague fusion of limbo and purgatory: "Status enim anime que perveniet ad felicitatem cum exuitur a corpore non est sine fine, sed ad tempus finibilis, eo quod creata est sapiens naturaliter et bona, quare potius tendit ad id quod est de natura sua quam ad contrarium, *nisi habeat impediens*" (p. 299). The half-way point along the dispositions of the right corresponds to the point reached by Dante's pilgrim at the end of Purg. XXVII, *justification*: "Sexta est ut dominetur anima sibi ipsi et obediat sibi ipsi et ut dominans et dominatum sint idem, quod est dicere ut ipsa sit equata sibi ipsi in velle et habere et posse et est sensus: tantum velit habere quantum habet vel habere potest et e contrario et tantum velle facere quantum facit vel facere potest et e contrario, et sic non erit diminutio in sua essentia, actu nec potentia, quia sua essentia eadem est suis formis et sue forme eedem cum ea et hanc equationem dominationemque felicem nemo habet in vita ista" (pp. 288–9). Here are all the elements of *justificatio impii*, whose relevance to the Purgatorio has been traced by Singleton (Journey, pp. 57–71). The anonymous author echoes the Aristotelian conception of *generatio* (*motus ad formam*) with the words "essentia eadem est suis formis . . ." and associates it with Christian justification by adding "nemo habet in vita ista," which recalls Psalm 142, 2, and Dante's "lo passo che non lasciò già mai persona viva." For *generatio* as *praeparatio ad gratiam*, see Singleton, ibid., pp. 43–54.

[70] "libero, dritto e sano è tuo arbitrio,/e fallo fora non fare a suo senno:/ per ch'io te/ sovra te corono e mitrio." Purgatorio, XXVII, 140. Dante uses Boethius' definition of the *liberum arbitrium* in the De monarchia: "liberum arbitrium esse liberum de voluntate iudicium" (I, xii, 2). He goes on to say, ". . . dico quod

beasts and the area over which they preside primarily pertain to the *affectus*, which is to say, to the "heart" rather than to the mind.

Here then is a picture of man in his present state, without the guidance he needs, left to himself. By an overwhelming effort he can avoid sin itself, but each victory will be costly, and he cannot progress beyond negative goodness, for three beasts block his path, and threaten to make each victory a temporary one. These three beasts are not sins, for it is not sin that checks man's escape route from the forest of sin. Rather are they dispositions *toward* sin, and they afflict every man, to a greater or lesser degree, with-

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iudicium medium est apprehensionis et appetitus: nam primo res apprehenditur, deinde apprehensa bona vel mala iudicatur; et ultimo iudicans prosequitur sive fugit" (I, xii, 3). Hence "arbitrio" is the act of choice midway between the "senno" (apprehensive) and the actual deed ("fare"). Dante as a rationalist, had to believe in the priority of intellect in the act of choice. Thus the pilgrim begins the shorter journey with an apprehension of the truth, the glance up at the light. In the concatenation of apprehensive and appetitive movements, represented by the steps of the feet, one or the other of the feet had to step out first, and this was *intellectus*. But even the *intellectus* had to have a prime mover, and this, like the prime mover in every causal chain was God, Who called the pilgrim to look up at the truth (cf. Thomas, ST I, 82, 4 ad 3; Singleton, Journey, pp. 48–56). Thus, grace is operative in some sense in every human act, and the complexities of this problem of actual grace were to vex Christian philosophers until well after the Renaissance. Bruno Nardi ("Il libero arbitrio e l'asino di Buridano," Nel Mondo di Dante [Roma, 1944], pp. 287–303) affirmed Dante's "moral intellectualism," which the poet shared with some contemporary Averroists: "La libertà consiste dunque, per Dante, nel potere che ne ha la ragione, non prevenuta dall'appetito, di suggerire alla volontà quello che è da fare, non nel potere da parte di questa di opporsi anche al giudizio della ragione, come volevano Duns Scoto, Enrico di Gand ed altri, e nemmeno di volgere la ragione a compiacere il talento, come pensava Tommaso." He based his argument on Par. IV, 1–9 "Intra due cibi, distanti e moventi/d'un modo, prima si morrìa di fame,/che liber' uomo l'un recasse ai denti;/. . ./ per che s'i'mi tacea, me non riprendo,/ dalli miei dubbi d'un modo sospinto,/poi ch'era necessario, nè commendo." Nardi failed to distinguish the liberty of fallen man from the liberty of the justified, and therefore his conclusions seem somewhat facile. If our interpretation of the *piè fermo* verse is correct, in Inf. I, of all places, it is clear that the will does *not* necessarily follow the discernment of the intellect, and the pilgrim is obviously not free. The longer journey to the summit is precisely the quest for freedom, and is the work of grace. Nardi's flippant analysis of the human act in Thomas' writings fails to examine adequately the difference between the speculative reason and the practical. The former conforms to external reality, the latter depends upon the practical judgment of the *rectified* appetite, and hence can be turned. In the poem, it is Beatrice who resolves Dante's doubt in Par. IV, but Nardi has not attempted to evaluate her rôle, as grace, in the human act. The poet's point is that in this question of action, grace will be the prime mover on a subject who would otherwise remain inert. For the entire complex problem, at least as it applies to Thomas, see Lottin, "A propos de l'intellectualisme morale de S. Thomas d'Aquin," Psychologie et Morale III, 651.

out exception. We must turn now, if only for a moment, to these three impediments along the direct route.

The scholastics who had undergone the influence of Aristotle tried to harmonize the classic definition of the fall as *ignorantia* and *concupiscentia* with the Aristotelian divisions of the powers of the soul. At the same time, another theory of the fall, that of St. Anselm, was becoming more prominent, and in the writings of Albert, Bonaventure and Thomas this conception of the result of Adam's sin as the loss of original justice was to replace the older doctrine.[71] The result of these two tendencies is clearly visible in Dante's poem, and the poet was more complete and more subtle in this scene than our analysis has thus far suggested.

The summit of the mountain is the goal of both the itinerary led by Virgil and the attempted journey which the pilgrim undertakes on his own. It represents, in the moral allegory, an interior harmony in the soul, whereby the appetites, the movement of the left foot, are perfectly coordinated with the reason, which, as the right, must always choose the objective and point the way. In the Republic Plato compares this inner rectitude with right order in the state, and calls it, by analogy, justice.[72] Reason and desire are the two faculties which must be related to each other as ruler to subject. This, in germ, is the theory which was to become in the writings of St. Anselm, the concept of original justice in the soul, and it is this justice that Adam lost by his sin.[73]

The importance of this metaphor for the journey to the summit in Dante's poem need not detain us here, for it has been fully explored. Of particular interest for us is Plato's subdivision of the irrational "subjects" of the reason into two classes: desire (ἐπιθυμία) and passion (θυμός). Thus, just as the state is composed of three classes (traders, auxiliaries, counsellors), so the soul is made up of three powers, the concupiscent, irascible, and rational.

Aristotle felt that Plato's division was inadequate because, to mention one of several reasons, appetite seems to pertain to all three parts of the soul, the rational power having a kind of desire

[71] Lottin, IV, 274–5.

[72] Republic IV, 440a ff. Cf. Arist. I Politics 2, 11, 1254b5 and Thomas, ST I–II, 17, 7.

[73] The concept is set forth in detail by Lottin, III, 283 ff.

of its own, purely apart from its cognitive function. This he called "wish" (*βούλησις*). To Aristotle, a division more fundamental than Plato's seemed to be according to "mind" on one hand, and "appetite" on the other. In the second book of the De anima, he listed the three species of appetite: desire (*ἐπιθυμία*), passion (*θυμός*), and wish (*βούλησις*).[74] These were to become most influential in the development of scholastic psychology, for they came to be known as the concupiscent, irascible and rational appetites.

W. H. V. Reade has shown that St. Thomas moved away from Aristotle by equating the rational appetite with the Christian *voluntas*, or will.[75] St. Thomas seemed to misunderstand the pagan philosopher in another respect as well, for he admitted a formal division between *ira*, or passion, and *concupiscentia*, or desire, suggesting three separate powers as had Plato, whereas Aristotle merely distinguished them as different kinds of appetites. Reade attributed these errors of interpretation to the Latin translation of Aristotle used by Thomas, but as a matter of fact, such interpretations were already present in St. John Damascene's De fide orthodoxa, whose influence on thirteenth century psychology with respect to the faculties of the soul has been traced by Dom Odon Lottin.[76]

Regardless of the historical reasons for the garbling of Aristotle's text by the scholastics, it seems to have been interpreted as making these divisions: *intellectus* and *appetitus* at the broadest level, and *appetitus* further subdivided into *appetitus rationalis* (that is, *voluntas*) and *appetitus sensitivus*, which is in turn subdivided into the irascible and concupiscent powers. Thus, man's appetite is composed of rational (i.e. volitive), irascible, and concupiscent forces, the first of which is peculiarly human, while the other two are rational in man only because they are ruled by the first, and moved by it.[77] The composite three-fold appetite in

[74] De anima II, 3, 414b2; III, 9, 432b5 ff.

[75] W. H. V. Reade, The Moral System of Dante's Inferno (Oxford, 1909), p. 116 ff.

[76] Reade, p. 118; John Damascene, PG 94, 928b; Lottin, I, 394 ff.

[77] For an influential and typical statement of these divisions, we need only turn to Albertus Magnus, who identifies them and describes their respective rôles in the human act: "Si autem consideremus movens quodcunque movet, tunc sunt duo in genere moventia . . . . Quorum unum in genere quidem movens est ut decernens

man is what we call the will in the broadest sense. The Convivio demonstrates that Dante accepted these commonplace divisions of the human soul, when he spoke of the obedience the lower owes to the higher: "Nullo dubita che l'appetito razionale non sia più nobile che 'l sensuale" and again, "questo appetito [i.e., the sensitive, "che in noi dal nostro principio nasce"], che irascibile e concupisibile si chiama . . . a la ragione obedire conviene. . . ." [78] It may therefore be assumed that room was found in the Commedia, that most rational of all poems, for this common ordering of the soul's powers.

We cannot enter here into the debate concerning the moral system of Dante's Inferno except to suggest that it is according to the tripartite division of the appetitive faculty, agreed upon by Christians and pagans alike, that we are best enabled to see with the pilgrim a Christian hell from a Virgilian, and therefore pagan, perspective. As hell is the realm of those who have lost the *good*, who in their lives inverted the order of reason and desire, subjecting the former to the latter, so is hell's structure patterned on that of the human appetite, albeit in horrible inver-

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motum, alterum sicut impetum faciens in motu . . . . Si autem determinari habet movens, ut causans motum, tunc oportet duo esse ad minus, quorum unum determinat, et alterum facit impetum: & sic sunt duo moventia quae sunt vel intellectus & appetitus, vel phantasia & appetitus." (De anima III, IV, viii, text. 56; Opera omnia [Lugduni, 1651], III, 178.) After an analysis of the power of discernment, the appetitive power is similarly subdivided: ". . . appetitus, sicut diximus, commune aliquod est, et dividitur in appetitivam rationalem, et in appetitivam sensibilem: et illa quidem est quae rationalis voluntas proprie vocatur. Illa autem quae est sensibilis pars animae, vocatur desiderium." (Ibid., x, p. 181.) The sensitive appetite is twofold: "Desiderativa autem est animae sensibilis pars appetitiva, dividitur in concupiscibilem et irascibilem . . . : [Plato] vocavit autem concupiscibilem virtutem desiderativam eorum quae afficiunt secundum delectationem. . . . Irascibile autem vocavit virtutem animae quae insurgit ad arduum quod est in ausu et gloria et victoria et in omni eo quod collocat in gloria et in gradu quodam sublimitatis et altitudinis secundum seipsum. . . ." (Ibid., p. 182.) Albertus is careful to state that these powers are formally distinct from the irascible and concupiscent powers in animals: *in homine enim sunt rationales.* They participate in the rational insofar as they are subject to the will. Man is free only when the will maintains its power over all: "hoc modo [voluntas] quasi motor est aliarum virium ad actum vel actus, et hoc modo dicimus, quando per voluntatem domini sumus nos nostrorum actuum, et sumus liberi: quia liberum vocamus, quia causa sui est et non causa alterius." (Ibid.) This is the liberty which is conferred upon the pilgrim at the summit. Avicenna undoubtedly contributed much to these psychological doctrines. See Kitab al-Najat, VI in Avicenna's Psychology, trans. F. Rahman (London, 1952), p. 37 and Rahman's commentary, pp. 73–4.

[78] IV, XXII, 10; XXVI, 6.

sion. Malice, bestiality, and incontinence, the dispositions incarnate in fraud, violence and lust, correspond to disorders in the rational, irascible and concupiscent appetites.

There is surely no difficulty in identifying lower hell with sins of malice, whose distinctive feature is that reason participates directly in their commission, and in identifying upper hell with sins of incontinence, which only secondarily imply the use of reason. The major quarrel about hell's structure has arisen about the suitability of the expression "matta bestialità" to that middle area of "forza" in Dante's divisions. The trouble seems to be that in Thomas' commentary on the relevant passages of the Nicomachean Ethics, from which Dante got his divisions, one finds both "bestialis malitia" and "bestialis incontinentia," and there seems therefore to be no distinctive "bestialità." [79] Without entering into the debate it will suffice us to notice that just as the irascible power stands between the concupiscent and the rational, so bestiality manifests itself as either will to injury or animal violence. It is perhaps for this reason that the middle region of hell is presided over by the Minotaur, beast in the form of man, and by the centaurs, men in the shape of beasts. Bestiality, like every mediate point in an ontological chain,[80] partakes of both the higher and the lower, and man and beast meet in the seventh circle, as they do in the soul's irascible appetite.

Giacinto Casella was perhaps the first to suggest that Dante's three beasts were related to the three categories of sin in the Inferno, and others, in the vast literature pertaining to these animals, have identified them with the three Aristotelian "dispositions that heaven does not want: incontinence, malice and mad bestiality." [81] Both interpretations are in a sense correct, for as hell represents the totality of sins which men have com-

[79] See Reade's lengthy and somewhat inconclusive discussion, op. cit., pp. 404–30.

[80] The principle of mediation, a characteristic of much of Greek philosophy, was expressed by Thomas Aquinas as "natura in suo infimo contingit naturam in ejus supremo." (Contra Gent. II, 91.) The importance of this principle for all phases of theological speculation remains to be explored. Among recent partial examinations of the problem is Rudolf Allers' "Triad and Mediation in Augustine" (The New Scholasticism, XXXI, 4, October, 1957).

[81] "Non ti rimembra di quelle parole/con le quai la tua Etica pertratta/le tre disposizion che 'l ciel non vole,/incontinenza, malizia e la matta/ bestialitade? . . ." Inf. XI, 79–83. Cf. Nicomachean Ethics VII, I, 1145a16: "circa mores fugiendorum tres sunt species, malitia incontinentia et bestialitas."

mitted, so must these three beasts somehow comprise the totality of impediments on the direct road to beatitude. The will, and the will alone, is the locus of sin, and hell therefore is patterned on its threefold division: the rational (*voluntas* properly speaking), the irascible, and the concupiscent appetites.[82] Similarly, since the middle ground represents the area between sin and virtue, where man is left to struggle on his own to overcome the weaknesses of his fallen nature, the totality of dispositions toward sin, which likewise reside in the appetitive faculty, can be discerned there in the prologue scene.

One of the proofs offered by medieval thinkers for the existence of original sin and its deleterious effects was the fact that man, the highest of all forms of animal life, nevertheless suffers from a fear of animals.[83] There is something unnatural about such a situation, or rather, something which has become natural to man only since Adam's fall. That fear recommends itself as an excellent symbol for the shortcomings of human nature, and it may be that Dante intended to allude to those shortcomings with the symbol of the beasts. The source of Dante's images is undoubtedly Jeremiah 5, 4–6:

> Forsitan pauperes sunt et stulti ignorantes viam domini, judicium Dei sui . . . . Idcirco percussit eos leo de silva, lupus ad vesperam vastavit eos, pardus vigilans super civitates eorum. Omnis, qui egressus fuerit ex eis, capietur, quia multiplicatae sunt praevaricationes eorum, confortatae sunt aversiones eorum.

Here are all the elements of the first part of Dante's prologue scene: the forest, the three animals, and the *ignorantia viae Domini*. According to our reading up to this point, the glance at the light and the subsequent escape from the forest represent a conversion from ignorance and sin. One of the classic wounds of nature was thereby overcome, and there remained the other traditional affliction to which man in this life is subject: concupiscence, the wound of the *affectus*. Just as the *affectus* or ap-

[82] As in the discussions of the "firm foot," here too, D'Ovidio will serve as guide through the mass of bibliography. For his remarks on Casella's work, which has not been available to me, see in particular "Le Tre Fiere," Studii sulla Divina Commedia (Milano, 1901), pp. 305 ff.

[83] Summa Theologica tract. III, q. II, mem. I, n.220; Quaracchi III, pp. 232–3.

petite is tri-partite, however, so the general wound to which we have heretofore referred as concupiscence was in reality threefold.

The mention of the "lonza" in the pilgrim's descent signals the entrance into the area of fraud, for it was with the rope-girdle used to summon Geryon that the pilgrim once had hoped to "prender la lonza alla pelle dipinta." [84] Since fraud is "dell'uom proprio male," there is no difficulty associating the leopardess with the rational appetite, the will, peculiar to man alone.[85] The description of the wolf "di tutte brame . . . carca" quite clearly suggests the concupiscent appetite,[86] and the lion would seem an apt symbol for the irascible appetite, even if Thomas had not specifically called it to mind as a symbol of bestiality in the commentary on the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics, the source of Dante's "tre disposizioni." [87]

St. Cyprian, in the early years of Christianity, was the first to use the expression "vulnera naturae" to refer to the effect of Adam's sin on the rest of mankind.[88] It was St. Augustine who established the traditional ignorance and concupiscence pair, for according to the Bishop of Hippo, every sin consisted of an aversion from truth, ignorance, and a conversion to evil, concupiscence.[89] The Venerable Bede added two more defects to these: malice and weakness,[90] and these four then became traditional. The pseudo-Alexander of Hales insisted on the need for grace to heal the wounds of the *status naturae lapsae*;

[84] "Io avea una corda intorno cinta,/ e con essa pensai alcuna volta/ prender la lonza alla pelle dipinta." Inf. XVI, 106. Just as Dante had hoped to catch the *lonza* with this girdle of self-reliance, so when he momentarily passes the *lonza* on the prologue scene, he seems almost confident about what appears to be an initial victory: "sì ch'a bene sperar m'era cagione/di quella fera alla gaetta pelle/l'ora del tempo e la dolce stagione." Inf. I, 41–43.

[85] "Ma perchè frode è dell'uom proprio male,/più spiace a Dio; e però stan di sutto/li frodolenti è più dolor li assale." Inf. XI, 25–27.

[86] "Ed una lupa, che di tutte brame/sembrava carca nella sua magrezza,/e molte genti fè già' viver grame/" Inf. I, 49–51. In his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Thomas refers to the wolf as "vorax in omnibus" in a context which deals with various types of incontinence (In Eth. VII, vi).

[87] "Alio modo potest corrumpi contemperantia humanarum affectionum alicujus bestiae, puta leonis aut porci. Et hoc est quod vocatur bestialitas." (VII, i).

[88] De opere et eleemosynis 1; PL 4, 603.

[89] Ad Simplicianum I, 1, 9; PL 40, 106. See also Contra Julianum VI, x, 29; PL 44, 839. For the later history of this doctrine, see Lottin IV, 55 ff.

[90] In Lucam 10, 30; PL 92, 469.

> Propter *ignorantiam* agendorum necessaria est gratia, quae est lux spiritualis ipsam animam illuminans. Propter *infirmitatem*, qua homo impotens est assurgere ad opus virtutis . . . necessaria est gratia quae virtutem animae ministrat. Propter *malitiam*, qua homo pronitatem habet ad malum et aversionem a Deo, necessaria est gratia quae animam ad Deum erigat et a malo avertat. Propter *concupiscentiam* . . . necessaria est gratia quae aeternorum saporem inducat et sic vehementia concupiscentiae diminuat.[91]

According to Thomas Aquinas, when Adam was created he had original justice, which is to say that his reason held perfect sway over the lower powers of his soul, and was in turn perfectly subjected to God. This perfect subjection was exemplified by four virtues, which resided in reason (prudence), the will (justice), the irascible appetite (fortitude), and the concupiscent (temperance). When he was stripped of these virtues, he suffered the four corresponding "wounds": ignorance, malice, weakness and concupiscence.[92]

That the dark wood suggests not only actual sin but ignorance as well, will be readily admitted by anyone familiar with the tradition called to mind by the pilgrim's glance up to the light. Further, others have argued convincingly about how well the wolf and the leopardess represent concupiscence and malice respectively.[93] The only difficulty seems to be with the identification of the lion as the *vulnus* of weakness. This difficulty vanishes, however, when we pause to consider what *infirmitas* means in this context. Thomas has this to say about it:

> sicut quanto fuerit motus fortior in corpore praeter ordinem naturae, tanto est maior infirmitas; ita quanto fuerit motus fortior passionis praeter ordinem rationis, tanto est maior infirmitas animae.[94]

Thus it is precisely because of its great irrational violence that the lion is the perfect symbol of human weakness.

One last point must be made. It has been thought by some Dantists that the greatest objection to the identification of the

[91] Summa Theologica IV, tr. III, quaest. III, 1,510; Quaracchi II, 746.
[92] ST I–II, 85, 3; cf. De malo 2, 11.
[93] D'Ovidio, Studii, pp. 305 ff.
[94] ST I–II, 77, 3, ad 1.

three beasts as somehow analogous to the three major categories of sin, and more specifically, to the identification of the wolf as concupiscence, was the fact that in the allegory it was this beast, representative of the least serious of sins, which proved to be the only really insurmountable barrier on the road to the summit.[95] Far from proving to be an objection, however, this is rather a buttress for such an identification.

Purely from the standpoint of human experience, and quite independently of any theological tradition, it is clear that the more prone one is toward sin, through no personal fault, the less is one's culpability for its commission. On the other hand, the further one progresses toward virtue, the less serious are the faults remaining to be purged, but the more difficult are they to overcome. The last step toward perfection, for those who believe in such moral progress, is always the most difficult to take. In Dante's poem, it is perhaps for this reason that the last barrier between the pilgrim and the summit of the mount of Purgatory, the flames of Purgatory XXVII, seem so fearsome that he refuses, momentarily, to take the last step.[96] The same is true of the last barrier in the middle ground. The universality of the wolf's reign diminishes the culpability involved in becoming subject to her, and that universality makes it most difficult, if not impossible, to elude her.

We are not dependent upon this argument, however, to prove that the insurmountable barrier represents a disposition toward the least serious of mortal sins, or that the least fearsome of the animals represents the gravest disposition. Thomas' elaboration of a principle laid down by Aristotle in the seventh book of the Ethics makes this clear:

> Sic ergo sicut bestia minus habet de culpa quam homo malus, sed est terribilior, ita etiam bestialis malitia seu etiam incontinentia *terribilior quidem est, sed minoris culpae et innocentior* quam

[95] D'Ovidio raised this objection to Casella's thesis: ". . . contro lui sta la contradizione ov'ei s'impiglia di volere dall'un lato che le tre fiere siano una prefigurazione precisa dell'Inferno, e dall'altro che la fiera meno temibile rappresenti giusto il peccato più cupo." Studii, p. 311.

[96] Twice the pilgrim refuses to enter into the flames, and submits only when Virgil reminds him: "Or vedi, figlio:/ tra Beatrice e te è questo muro." Purg. XXVII, 35–6.

> incontinentia seu malitia humana. Unde si aliqui amentes vel naturaliter bestiales peccent, minus puniuntur.[97]

Similarly bestial concupiscence is at once less grave and more fearsome than human malice.

Concupiscence, in the broad sense, was the wound suffered by the *affectus*, according to the doctrine established by St. Augustine and supported by his authority throughout the Middle Ages. After the general acceptance of St. Anselm's theory of original justice and its loss, however, Thomas used the word "concupiscentia" to denote the loss of the reason's control over each of the three powers of the faculty of appetite. Thus concupiscence in the broad sense included the wounds of the rational, irascible and concupiscent appetites. According to Dom Lottin, this was Aquinas' way of adopting Anselm's theory without at the same time appearing to abandon Augustine's.[98] Concupiscence as more strictly defined by Aquinas, on the other hand, was closer to the Augustinian concept: the disorder of the lowest appetite. In the allegory of Eden, concupiscence plays the rôle of the serpent, and in many moments of the soul's existence, the drama of Eden is reenacted.[99] The serpent, the *primus motus* of the sensitive appetite, suggests a course of illicit action, and if it is not immediately suppressed, the consequence is sin. Only grace can help suppress this first movement of concupiscence, but the movement itself can never be totally eradicated in this life: *nunquam in hac vita totaliter tollitur*.[100]

The wolf represents just this kind of concupiscence. When the pilgrim reaches her, he has gone as far as any man in this life, without sanctifying grace, can go. Just as she succeeds in pushing him back "a poco, a poco," so the wound of concupiscence, precisely because of its less serious nature, can become the source of all sins, until it succeeds in pushing man back to the point "là dove 'l sol tace." The glance at the sun begins a move-

[97] In Eth. VII, vi, end.

[98] Lottin IV, 275.

[99] For the most influential statement of the allegory see Augustine, De trinitate XII, 12 (PL 42, 1007–8). The temptation of the serpent was identified with the "primus motus" of the sensitive appetite, or concupiscence of the flesh.

[100] "perpetua corruptio sensualitas est intelligenda quantum ad fomitem, qui nunquam totaliter tollitur in hac vita: transit enim peccatum originale reatu, et remanet actu." Thomas, ST I–II, 74, 4, ad 2.

ment toward the soul's perfection which, without grace, will be halted by the last impediment between the soul and its object. At any moment, that impediment can become the occasion of a reverse movement, a backsliding, to use Jeremiah's expression, back into the condition of actual sin.[101] Without God's help, man can only stagger repeatedly out of the forest by his own power, only to return again to the misery out of which he has come.

This last barrier, the wolf, is the one of which St. Paul was acutely aware. According to Augustine, Paul's agony was caused precisely by the "malum concupiscentiae"[102] and this *incontinentia* is what the pagan Socrates, in Thomas' reading, did not understand.[103] For the Christian, it is the middle ground between Virtue and Vice which poses the insoluble problem. The final wound can only be completely cured in the hereafter, in purgatorial fire, as Dante would have it: "con tal cura conviene e con tai pasti/che la piaga da sezzo si ricucia."[104] Until that time, man must lean upon a guide sent from heaven.

To make the shorter journey is to do what no man has ever done. The best for which man on his own can hope is to ward off those three beasts for the time being, and avoid being pushed back into actual sin. Without guidance, all men must despair of reaching the summit, but some can hold their ground at least a little while. That ground, the middle ground between sin and true Christian virtue, is a deserted slope because few men have made it their land. Only Virgil and the other virtuous pagans were familiar with the moral landscape, so to speak, and if we wished to go beyond the text in a way which would not have offended the poet, we might say that this middle area is analogous to Limbo, where the noble souls are neither happy with

[101] Bonaventure represented the causal chain in meteorological terms: "Et sicut in maiori mundo vapores elevati infrigidantur propter malitiam aeris et praepediunt aspectum solis; sic in minori mundo cogitationes de *sensualitate ascendentes* infrigidantur et calore gratiae privantur propter malitiam rationis peccato consentientis et impediunt aspectum solis iustitiae." Sermones II, Opera IX, 226.

[102] Ad Simplicianum, I, 1.6–17; PL 40, 104 ff.; Serm. ad popul. 30, 2–3; PL 38, 188–9; Contra Jul. 3, 26; PL 44, 733.

[103] Thomas' exposition of Aristotle's *incontinentia* recalls Paul's *malum concupiscentiae*: "Si quidem igitur sit perversitas ex parte appetitus ut ratio practica remaneat recta, erit incontinentia, quae scilicet est, quando aliquis rectam aestimationem habet de eo quod est faciendum vel vitandum, sed propter passionem appetitus in contrariam trahit." In Eth. VII, 1.

[104] Purg. XXV, 136–9.

the joy of the summit nor afflicted with the despair of the damned. They are relegated to Limbo, because it was in a kind of limbo that they struggled to live, where man does not wander blindly as in a forest, but rather hobbles painfully in the light.

A NOTE ON PLATONISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JONATHAN EDWARDS

RECENT published allusions to Platonism in the minds of Calvinists, and the compatibility of its position there, brings back the memory of Professor William Wallace Fenn's[1] interpretation of the thought of Jonathan Edwards, in lectures more than twenty-five years ago at the Harvard Theological School. Since this interpretation is no longer popular among writers, it might be of interest to mention it again. Professor Fenn liked to picture Edwards as the protagonist of a New England Tragedy. There was tragedy in the outward failures of his life. But the more devastating tragedy was his inward failure as a Christian philosopher. This, according to Fenn's interpretation, arose from Edwards' self-conscious awareness of being unable to reconcile his Platonism with his Calvinism.

The issue barely arises in the thought of Edwards as author of the treatises on the freedom of the will[2] and original sin. At any rate what little Platonism may lurk there does not detract from the Calvinistic tenets. This judgment, however, is perhaps not possible of the thought of Edwards in the posthumously published dissertations on the nature of true virtue and end for which God created the world. These two little treatises are steeped in the idea of emanation — a Platonic (or, to be more precise, a Neo-Platonic) concept, of course; and in the hardly restrained urge to identify God with *being*, which latter is sometimes understood as the sum-total of being, and sometimes as being in general, that is abstract being, or being *per se*. This urge was, indeed, very strong. But Edwards usually, at any rate, managed not to forget that he was first and foremost a Calvinist, and that as such he could not validly make this identification. The acuteness of Professor Fenn's interpretation shows up here, for, he used to point out, in no passage (or almost in no passage) in the two posthumous treatises does Edwards state the identification without qualifying it by the softening words "in effect" or "as it were."[3] The implication is that *some* being is not God, namely, the being

[1] William Wallace Fenn, 1862–1932, a profound student of Edwards and of all the New England theologians. Unfortunately his researches have never been published.

[2] There is no need of mentioning here that a new and critical edition of this work, edited by Paul Ramsey, appeared year before last (1957), Yale University Press; vol. 1 of a projected new edition of all Edwards' writings, under the general editorship of Perry Miller.

[3] The reader may be interested in checking a few instances of this stylistic prac-

involved in the fallen angels and in the post-lapsarian human race (except for the elect).

But then what is this being, however negligible it may be? This is the question which Edwards, caught between his Platonism and his Calvinism, could not answer. Incidentally, he does not seem to have been interested in the type of solution which attributes evil to a so-called "negative" cause, or sees in it mere absence of being.[4]

RUFUS SUTER

BRADBURY HEIGHTS
MARYLAND

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tice. See "A Dissertation Concerning the End for Which God Created the World," in vol. III of The Works of President Edwards: in Ten Volumes, New York, G. & C. & H. Carvill, 1830, pp. 34, 35, 38. Also "A Dissertation Concerning the Nature of True Virtue" in the same volume, pp. 108, 153.

These dissertations were published originally, together, in 1788, in Boston.

[4] For evidence of this see the 5-page-long footnote, signed "W," in "Miscellaneous Remarks," in vol. VII of the edition cited above, though the imprint is changed to New York, S. Converse, 1829, pp. 405–409. The "W" stands for Dr. Williams, editor of an earlier English edition of Edwards' works.

I am sorry to give references to an edition accessible with difficulty. But this edition is probably no harder to find than another — until the new Yale edition is complete.

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